Sub S One Class of Stock Requirement: Rulemaking Gone Wrong by Berry, Carole C.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 44 
Issue 1 Fall 1994 Article 6 
1994 
Sub S One Class of Stock Requirement: Rulemaking Gone Wrong 
Carole C. Berry 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Carole C. Berry, Sub S One Class of Stock Requirement: Rulemaking Gone Wrong, 44 Cath. U. L. Rev. 11 
(1995). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
ARTICLES
SUB S ONE CLASS OF STOCK REQUIREMENT:
RULEMAKING GONE WRONG
Carole C. Berry*
The promulgation of regulations by federal agencies is often a cumber-
some and time consuming exercise.' The purpose of this Article is to
examine the rulemaking process and, more specifically, how that process
relates to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) that allow
Subchapter S corporations to issue only one class of stock (one class of
stock requirement).2 In the process, this Article will explore: (1) the In-
ternal Revenue Service's (IRS) procedures for promulgating tax regula-
tions; (2) the theory of negotiated rulemaking and its use by selected
agencies; (3) the federal act that allowed those agencies to use negotiated
rulemaking; and finally (4) how the IRS could have used this process ef-
fectively in formulating the Subchapter S regulations.
A brief review of the Subchapter S regulations is instructive, 3 especially
given the long and stormy history of the Subchapter S one class of stock
requirement. In 1958, Congress enacted Subchapter S of the Code.4 Sub-
chapter S allows certain small businesses to elect to be treated, for tax
purposes, as pass-through entities.5 Thus, double taxation on distributed
earnings is eliminated and shareholders can take advantage of corporate
* B.S., Michigan State, University; J.D., Ph.D., The Ohio State University. The au-
thor would like to thank Professors Cynthia G. LePow, N. Douglas Wells, and Robert C.
Berry and Research Assistant J. Allen Rider for their helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this article.
1. See S. REP. No. 97, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989).
2. I.R.C. § 1361(a)(2)(D) (1988).
3. A detailed description of the history of Subchapter S may be found in JAMES S.
EUSTICE & JOEL D. KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS 1 (1985).
4. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, title I, Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606 (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. §§ 1371-1377 (1993)).
5. I.R.C. § 1362(a) (1993); see also EUSTICE & KUNTZ, supra note 3, at $ 1.02[3][d]
(stating that the original Subchapter S allowed a corporation's undistributed income to be
taxed at the shareholder level as dividends, thereby passing through the corporation).
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losses while remaining insulated from corporate liability.' Consequently,
many small businesses have chosen the S corporation as their preferred
business form.7
To qualify for S corporation standing, a business cannot have: (1) more
than thirty-five shareholders, (2) shareholders other than individuals, es-
tates, or certain qualifying trusts, (3) a nonresident alien as a shareholder,
or (4) more than one class of stock.8 If any of the four statutory require-
ments is violated, the corporation ceases to be an S corporation,9 and the
entity may be forced to wait five years before it is allowed to reelect S
corporation status.10 Of the four prerequisites for S corporation standing,
the one class of stock requirement has proven to be the most difficult
qualification to define. To fully appreciate the problems associated with
this regulation or any other regulation, however, it is necessary to ex-
amine generally the process of rulemaking.
I. THE RULEMAKING PROCESS
For almost fifty years, the Administrative Procedure Act" (APA) has
set forth the procedures used by administrative agencies to promulgate
rules and regulations. Remarkably, the APA has proven to be both dura-
ble12 and unusually impervious to change. 3 Thus, it is not surprising that
attempts to alter the mechanism for fashioning regulations have been met
with some skepticism. 4 Increased dissatisfaction with the APA rulemak-
ing process,15 however, has created the potential for changes in a system
6. See § 1363(a) (1993); see also EUSTICE & KUNTZ, supra note 3, at 9 1.02[3][d]
(explaining that ordinary corporate losses pass through to shareholders while capital losses
do not).
7. JAMES S. EUSTICE & JOEL D. KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPO-
RATIONS iii (3d. ed. 1993).
8. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) to (D) (1993).
9. Id. § 1362(d)(2).
10. Id. § 1362(g).
11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 3105, 3344 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
12. William H. Allen, The Durability of the APA, 72 VA. L. REV. 235, 235 (1986).
13. Id. (stating that the APA has undergone only three amendments in its 40 year
existence).
14. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking and Administrative Law, 38 ADMIN.
L. REV., 471, 472-73 (1986) (discussing the fear of destroying the APA's flexibility through
amendments).
15. Many groups, including academics, industry, public interest groups, the private sec-
tor, the courts, and even the agencies themselves have criticized the rulemaking process
over the course of the past decade. Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory
and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 135 (1985). Most parties
that take part in rulemaking complain about the time and expense involved in creating and
implementing a regulation. Id. at 133-34; Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an
Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1871, 1872-73 (1981) (explaining
the complicated procedures for implementing regulations). For example, businesses claim
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that "had become increasingly adjudicatory and adversarial in character
since the 1960s.
' 16
The APA prescribes two principal methods for promulgating regula-
tions by federal agencies. The first is known as formal rulemaking,
17
where, in a trial-like setting, testimony and exhibits provide evidence,
which is then converted into a transcript.' 8 The transcript constitutes the
required record for the proposal of a new rule.1 9 This is a cumbersome
process both from the agency standpoint and for those parties who are
involved outside of the agency.2" For example, commentators note that
in applying formal rulemaking procedures, the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration took almost ten years to determine whether peanut butter should
be eighty-seven or ninety percent peanuts.
21
The second method of promulgating regulations, informal rulemaking,
is somewhat less time consuming and certainly less cumbersome.22 The
informal process generally provides for notice and comment procedures
prior to the implementation of a regulation.23 Under these provisions,
agencies must publish a notice of the proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register.24 The comment procedures require agencies to provide not
only an opportunity for public comment, but also to consider the com-
ments that are received.25 Only after these conditions are satisfied can
the agencies publish the final rule.26 The rule then waits thirty days
"that delays are costly and increase the uncertainty surrounding investment decisions,"
while public interest groups claim "that litigation delays implementation of important
rules." Susskind & McMahon, supra, at 134 (footnotes omitted). Judges cite their inability
to deal with the myriad of complex and technical issues contained in the regulations. Id.
On the other hand, agency personnel complain that the courts and Congress mandated
many procedural requirements that restrict their autonomy. Id. Finally, academics often
agree with all of these concerns and complaints. Id. at 133.
16. Perritt, supra note 14, at 471.
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
18. Id.; see 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:3, at 453-58
(2d ed. 1978) (explaining that this process, known as "rules made on the record," is re-
quired by formal rulemaking).
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557; see 1 DAVIS, supra note 18, § 6:3, at 453.
20. See I DAVIS, supra note 18, § 6:8, at 475 (noting that "judges, legislators, adminis-
trators, and practitioners" agree that formal rulemaking is "not good for making rules of
general applicability").
21. James T. Harrington and Barbara A. Frick, Opportunities for Public Participation
in Administrative Rulemaking, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 537, 541 (1983) (citing I DAVIS,
supra note 18, § 6:8, at 475).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see 1 DAVIS, supra note 18, § 1:4, at 13
(defining informal rulemaking as rulemaking without the burdens of a trial-type hearing).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d).
24. Id. § 553(b).
25. Id. § 553(c).
26. Id. § 553(d).
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before it becomes effective. 7 While this method of rulemaking is more
flexible than the formal rulemaking provisions, the informal rulemaking
procedures assume that parties with an interest in the outcome will use
adversarial techniques to persuade the decision makers to adopt a partic-
ular position. 8 Interested parties employ various representatives who
present written data or views before the agency and occasionally even
present oral arguments.2 9 In this respect, a type of sequential negotiation
takes place. In other words, because different parties represent different
points of view and present them one at a time to the agency,30 there is no
time for interaction among the various interest groups.
Initially, the formal and informal rulemaking procedures appear to be
routinely simplistic. However, as a result of growing concern over the
exercise of agency discretion and accountability in the increasing myriad
of complex regulations,3 1 the executive branch, Congress, and the courts
have added significant baggage to the statute in the last several years.
Specifically, Executive Orders 12,29132 and 12,498 3 expanded the over-
sight function of the Office of Management and Budget to include an
appraisal of the cost efficiency of proposed regulations. In addition, Con-
gress enacted the Freedom of Information Act,3 4 the Government in the
Sunshine Act,35 the Federal Advisory Committee Act,3 6 and amended
the APA to prohibit ex parte communications during both the formal
rulemaking and adjudication processes.37
At the same time, the courts also have restructured informal rulemak-
ing in a series of decisions that expanded both the duties of agencies and
the role of reviewing courts. 38 As a result of the expansion that took
27. Id.
28. Note, supra note 15, at 1872-73 (noting that useful adversarial techniques include
formal argument and use of proof).
29. Id. at 1873 (listing "lawyers, lobbyists, and others" as examples of representatives).
30. Id. at 1874 (stating that "face-to-face negotiations among the parties themselves
that characterize regulatory negotiation" do not occur).
31. James V. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65
VA. L. REV. 257, 342-43 (1979) (addressing the effect of statutory language on an agency's
discretionary power).
32. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
33. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring agencies to make available to the
public certain agency rules, orders, records, and proceedings together with opinions that
form the basis of agency decisions).
35. Id. § 552b (requiring that agencies hold open meetings for most proceedings).
36. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (limiting the use of advisory commit-
tees to agencies).
37. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
38. See DeLong, supra note 31, at 262-76 (discussing the cases that established "strin-
gent requirements" for informal rulemaking).
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place in these "'hybrid rulemaking cases,' "" informal rulemaking as en-
visioned by the APA has evolved "into a new kind of on-the-record pro-
ceeding.",40 These cases expanded both the rules of standing41 and the
notice and comment requirements. 42 The courts Also enlarged the devel-
opment and use of the factual record,43 while utilizing the so-called
" 'hard look' " approach in reviewing agency action.44 As a result of
these various changes, the informal rulemaking process has become in-
creasingly adversarial in nature and procedurally formalized.45 It is little
39. Id. at 259 (footnote omitted).
40. Id. at 260 (footnote omitted). As noted by DeLong, these terms can be confusing
because formal rulemaking requires a proceeding " 'on the record,' " as mandated by 5
U.S.C. § 556, which necessitates both a formal record and various adjudicatory rights,
whereas many of the hybrid cases appear to require the term " 'on the rulemaking rec-
ord,' " which "does not create the same procedural rights." Id. at 260 n.16 (citing I DAVIS,
supra note 18, §§ 6:3, at 454-55, 6:4, at 458-59).
41. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (holding that standing is not confined to only those showing " 'eco-
nomic harm' ").
42. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also I DAVIS,
supra note 18, §§ 6:19, 6:20, 6:25, 6:26.
43. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). In Portland Cement, the court held that there were
critical defects in the decision-making process because the Environmental Protection
Agency neither provided the manufacturers with the technical information that formed the
basis of the regulation in a timely fashion, nor responded adequately to the manufacturer's
comments and objections to that same technical information. Id.; see also Solite Corp. v.
EPA, 952 F.2d 473, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that technical and scientific data must be
made available to interested parties); Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. EPA. 941 F.2d 1339,
1359 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 771
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1045 (1989); Connecticut Light & Power Co.
v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525, 530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 835 (1982); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-52
(2d Cir. 1977) (same); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76,
488 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
44. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The court defined the hard look approach as the necessity of
agencies to "articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the
significance of the crucial facts." Id. If the agency itself has not "taken a 'hard look' at the
salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making," courts, in
their supervisory function, must intervene. Id. (footnote omitted). In other words, the
court cannot uphold agency decisions unless the agency has used reasons and standards to
address the issues. Id.
45. While these developments no doubt have led to increased agency accountability,
they nevertheless also have produced increased costs, complexity, and time necessary for
the promulgation of rules and regulations. With only adversarial challenges to the process,
those outside the agency have made little progress in addressing policy concerns. There-
fore, one must question whether agency legitimacy is achieved through the present
procedures.
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wonder that scholars46 and even the agencies themselves 47 have made
suggestions for reform.
Given the changes made by the executive branch,48 Congress,49 and the
courts, ° as well as the constantly changing Internal Revenue Code, it is
hardly surprising that regulation projects are far behind the Code sections
that they are supposed to define. For illustrative purposes, an examina-
tion of the process through which a regulation is formulated will best ex-
emplify the myriad of problems with the present system.
II. RULEMAKING AND THE IRS
A. Preparing Regulations for Notice and Comment
While the IRS issues various types of rules, the regulations and Depart-
ment of Treasury (Treasury) decisions that are prepared by the Office of
Chief Counsel are the most important to the general public.5 The Inter-
nal Revenue Service Manual prescribes the procedure used to develop,
review, and approve regulations.5 2 The decision to open a regulations
project53 is made in collaboration "with attorneys from the Treasury De-
partment, Office of the Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), and with repre-
46. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 341-63 (1982). Scholars have
suggested numerous ideas for reform. One such suggestion is an effort to attract " 'better
people'" into the government to handle regulatory responsibilities. Id. at 342-45. An-
other proposal is to make several procedural changes designed to impose strict standards
and to increase legal formality to achieve fairness. Id. at 346-50. These changes would
increase efficiency in both formal and informal rulemaking. Such changes also would en-
hance the opportunity to participate in agency decisionmaking and the ability of agency
decisions to achieve a greater degree of legitimacy through judicial review. Id. at 350-54.
Other reform suggestions include structural changes to set up a system of checks and bal-
ances to clarify intra-agency responsibility and increase intra-agency efficiency, changes in
the relationship between agencies and the rest of government in an effort to increase su-
pervision of performance, and finally, the creation of new institutions, such as an adminis-
trative court, technical review board, and ombudsman, designed to help overcome
problems of regulation. Id. at 354-63; see also ALAN STONE, REGULATION AND ITS AL-
TERNATIVES 237-74 (1982) (discussing the need for reform, but failing to make a consensus
recommendation about what should be done).
47. See infra notes 139-214 and accompanying text (discussing agency successes and
failures in using negotiated rulemaking).
48. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
51. Treas. Reg. § 601.601 (as amended in 1987). The IRS Commissioner initiates regu-
lations and Treasury decisions, which subsequently need approval by the Secretary of
Treasury or the Secretary's delegate. Id.
52. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL ch. (39)311
(1992) [hereinafter I.R.M.].
53. Id. ch. (39)312(1) (stating that "[rlegulations projects are opened when it is neces-
sary or desirable to clarify or amend existing regulations or to provide new regulations").
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sentatives of the Legislative Affairs Division of the Assistant to the
Commissioner (Public Affairs).- 54 If a project is opened, attorneys from
the Chief Counsel's Office (Domestic) (Domestic drafting attorney) and
the Tax Legislative Counsel (TLC) are assigned to the project and meet
to determine the substance of the regulations, possible joint development,
and an implementation schedule.55 The Domestic drafting attorney then
prepares an "Issues Memorandum," which identifies project issues and
potential solutions.56 If there are major policy issues to be addressed and
resolved, a "policy memorandum" also is prepared.57 On the other hand,
the Domestic attorney and the Treasury attorney usually try to resolve
nonpolicy issues on an informal basis.58 If a resolution is not possible, the
Assistant Chief Counsel and an appropriate Treasury official will attempt
to find a solution.
59
Generally, the Domestic attorney has the duty to prepare the prelimi-
nary draft of the regulations, the policy memorandum, a 4-point memo-
randum for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other
necessary documents. 6° A Domestic reviewer is then responsible for a
"line-by-line" review of the draft regulations.61 In addition, the Treasury
attorney also will review the draft regulations along with the 4-point
memorandum and any policy memoranda. 62 A preliminary draft of the
regulations may be circulated to other individuals or offices within the
Chief Counsel (Domestic) or the IRS63 and subjected to further com-
54. Id. ch. (39)312(2). Once a project's opening is announced, the IRS encourages and
welcomes comments concerning the content of the regulations from interested parties who
can do so freely, either in written or oral form. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601 (1993).
55. I.R.M. ch. (39)312(3). A reviewer must be "satisfied that the draft Issues Memo-
randum identifies and analyzes the issues in the project thoroughly enough" before it is
finalized. Id. ch. (39)312(4).
56. Id. (39)312(4).




60. Id. (39)314.2(2) to -(3) (stating that the Domestic Attorney may be excused from
these duties only by agreement). A 4-point memorandum is required for "[a]ny regula-
tions document that must be approved by the Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) and is not a
major legislative regulation." Id. (39)314.2(2). It must include "(1) the identifying number
and title of the project; (2) whether the document is a Treasury decision or a notice of
proposed rulemaking; (3) what the document does, stated briefly; and (4) whether the
regulations are major legislative regulations." Id.
61. Id. (39)313(2).
62. Id. (39)314.5(2). The Treasury attorney also must provide written comments re-
garding the draft to the Domestic drafting attorney and to other persons significantly in-
volved within 30 days. Id.
63. Id. (39)314.3(1). Specifically, the regulations provide that copies of the policy
memoranda and a preliminary draft of the regulations are issued to: (1) the Treasury attor-
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ments.64 After all parties reviewing the document have determined that
all appropriate revisions have been made, the Domestic drafting attorney
notifies the Assistant Chief Counsel that the project is ready for brief-
ing.65 The Assistant Chief Counsel recommends which, if any, issues
should be addressed at a joint briefing. The Assistant Chief Counsel then
confers with other offices and individuals who have participated in the
project to assess whether a joint briefing is necessary.66 If a joint briefing
is necessary, all persons who will attend receive a policy memorandum for
the regulations project and a note indicating that the project will be
briefed and which issues will be briefed.67 After a joint briefing does
occur, the Domestic drafting attorney prepares a revised policy memo-
randum to note changes as a result of the briefing and revises the draft
regulations to reflect those changes. 68 Next, the Treasury attorney, re-
viewer, and other people in the IRS or Chief Counsel's Office who partic-
ipated in the review examine the revised draft of regulations and the
policy memorandum to determine whether they are consistent with sub-
stantive decisions regarding the regulation.69
Once the Domestic attorney, Treasury attorney, and their reviewers
have informally approved the draft regulations, and the Assistant Chief
Counsel has decided that no further review is necessary, the Domestic
drafting attorney prepares a signature package.7° The signature package
is then submitted to the Assistant Chief Counsel, the Associate Chief
Counsel (Domestic), the Chief Counsel, and the Commissioner for signa-
ture.7t Thereafter, the package goes to the Treasury, where the Assistant
ney; (2) the Assistant Chief Counsel (Field Service); (3) other Assistant Chief Counsel
offices; (4) the Associate Chief Counsel (International); (5) the Director for Tax Forms and
Publications Division (6) other persons within the IRS, (7) the International Tax Counsel;
(8) the Associate Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations) if appro-
priate; (9) other offices within the IRS that the Domestic drafting attorney and the re-
viewer deem appropriate or necessary; and (10) the counterpart field service branch of the
drafting Technical office. Id.
64. Id. (39)314.4, (39)314.5(1). Like Treasury attorneys, other officials making com-




67. Id. (39)314.7(3). Individuals who would participate in a joint briefing have the
option to request a briefing or to suggest any additional issues that should be briefed. Id.
68. Id. (39)314.8(1), .8(3).
69. Id. (39)314.8(5) (noting that any unsatisfactory drafting should be reported to the
Assistant Chief Counsel) Id.
70. Id. (39)314.9(1) to -(2).
71. Id. (39)314.9(2). Chronologically, the Assistant Chief Counsel will sign the pack-
age and then forward it to the Associate Chief Counsel (Domestic) for signature; after the
latter's signature is obtained, the package is then sent to the Chief Counsel, followed by
the Commissioner. Id.
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Secretary (Tax Policy), the General Counsel, and the Executive Secreta-
riat must indicate their approval.7 2 After Treasury approval, the regula-
tions finally are ready to be published in the Federal Register.73
B. The Notice and Comment Procedure
The notice and comment procedure commences when the proposed
regulation is published in the Federal Register. 74 In the event that inter-
ested parties request to be heard, the IRS sets a hearing time for that
purpose.75 Occasionally, the IRS may schedule a hearing at the same
time that the regulation is submitted for publication. Pursuant to section
601.601(a)(3)(i),7 6 people who wish to make oral comments at a public
hearing are directed to submit both written comments and an outline of
the topics to be discussed as well as the time necessary to discuss each
topic. 77 At the hearing, the oral comments ordinarily are restricted to a
discussion of or questions and answers related to the subject matter of the
written comments.7 1 If time permits, however, people who are not listed
on the agenda may be allowed to comment orally provided they have
given prior notification. 79 Nonetheless, the notice and comment provi-
sions may be waived "[in the case of unusual circumstances or for good
cause shown."8 With respect to general comments on proposed rules,
any interested persons may respond to a notice of proposed rulemaking
by submitting data, views, or arguments,81 but because any comments
made by the public are subject to public inspection, confidential material
will not be accepted.82
From beginning to end, this process can be extremely time consuming
and costly for both the government and those parties wishing to be heard.
72. Id. (39)314.9(4).
73. Id. (39)314.9(5). At the same time that the Domestic attorney is providing the
appropriate regulations and documents for filing with the Federal Register, he or she also
"will prepare and forward a diskette ...containing the approved regulation." Id.
(39)314.9(6).
74. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a)(2) (as amended in 1987).
75. Id. § 601.601(a)(3)(iii).
76. Id. § 601.601(a)(3)(i). For this section to apply, its rules must be "incorporated by
reference in a notice of hearing with respect to a notice of proposed rulemaking." Id.
77. Id. § 601.601(a)(3)(ii) to -(iii). The total time limit allotted for oral comment by
each advocate is ten minutes. Id. § 601.601 (a)(3)(iii).
78. Id. § 601.601(a)(3)(ii).
79. Id. § 601.601(a)(3)(iv). Interested persons may notify the IRS Commissioner
before the hearing or inform an IRS representative present at the entrance of the hearing
room either before or during the hearing. Id.
80. Id. § 601.601(a)(3)(v).
81. Id. § 601.601(b).
82. Id.
1994]
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Compounding these problems is the fact that the process can result in a
complete failure.8 3 This Article questions whether a better alternative
procedure exists for making regulation projects more efficient and satis-
factory and concludes that the concept of negotiated rulemaking may
provide the answer.
III. THE THEORY OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
The concept of rulemaking through negotiation, as introduced by John
T. Dunlop, revolutionized traditional rulemaking by shifting the focus of
promulgatory rules to those groups most interested in the outcome of
agency regulation.' Dunlop, who was Secretary of Labor during 1975-
1976,85 asserted in his article, The Limits of Legal Compulsion,86 that
"parties that will be affected by a set of regulations should be involved to
a greater extent in developing those regulations., 87 While the regulatory
agencies did not implement his ideas in practice or by the force of law,
they were not forgotten. 8 Rather, Philip J. Harter amplified Dunlop's
ideas in an article that addressed the shortcomings of traditional rulemak-
ing.89 By outlining his hypotheses for surmounting these shortcomings,
Harter's article formed the underlying conceptual basis for negotiated
rulemaking.
83. John T. Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Compulsion, 27 LAB. L.J. 67. 70 (1976) (ex-
plaining that interested parties with conflicting views may extend the comment process
indefinitely through petitions for clarification or review, or litigation before the agency or
courts).
84. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1,28-29
(1982) (discussing how the approach transcended the traditional rulemaking process, which
had considered participation to be merely submitting information); see Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by
the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1630-33 (1986) (dis-
cussing the emergence of negotiated rulemaking as a distinct process, as influenced by
Dunlop).
85. Our Cover, 27 LAB. L.J. (1976).
86. See Dunlop, supra note 83, at 67.
87. Id. at 72. Dunlop also lamented the lack of any "mechanism for the development
of mutual accommodation among the conflicting interests," such that opposing interests
could settle the differences between them instead of involving the government. Id. at 70.
Arguing that "[d]irect discussions and negotiations among opposing points of view, where
mutual accommodation is mutually desirable ... forces the parties to set priorities among
their demands," Dunlop concluded that this process would create an incentive for oppos-
ing interests to find common ground and foster mutual understanding. Id.
88. See Harter, supra note 84, at 28 (attributing the lack of interest in Dunlop's ideas
as a cause for their failure to become effectively implemented).
89. See id.; see also Perritt, supra note 84, at 1634 (discussing Harter's motivation to
break away from traditional rulemaking).
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At the outset, Harter conceded that negotiation is not appropriate in
all situations.9° Therefore, his first, and perhaps most important point, is
that parties will bargain only if they believe that the negotiations will pro-
duce a result that is at least as good as that which can be reached through
some other decisional process.91 This concept, called BATNA (Best Al-
ternative to a Negotiated Agreement) developed by Roger Fisher and
William Ury,92 simply assumes that rational people will only attempt to
negotiate if their resulting position is better than their position without
negotiating.93 Conversely, if a favorable negotiated result is questionable
and a party's position is superior to what is likely to transpire in negotia-
tion, the party will not participate in the negotiation. 94 Furthermore, de-
termination of a party's BATNA will turn on what negotiators perceive as
the results that will be achieved if the agency promulgates the regulation
without negotiation. 95
Harter's second construct dictates that parties have a certain degree of
equality insofar as the power to influence the course of the negotiation.96
In other words, there must be interdependence among negotiators, such
that any one of them is constrained from acting unilaterally.97 Thus, the
countervailing power among the parties balances-the outcome of the con-
flict, puts the result in doubt, and places the onus on the parties to recon-
cile their differences through negotiations.98 Conversely, if one party has
the power to effectively overwhelm other members of the negotiation
90. Harter, supra note 84, at 43.
91. Id. (illustrating this point through an example depicting the resolution of a dispute
between a customer and store after a discussion of the alternatives available to each).
92. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETrING TO YES 104 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
93. Id. (asserting that BATNA is a standard that should be used in evaluating any
proposal because of its ability to protect parties from inadvertently accepting or rejecting
regrettable terms).
94. Perritt, supra note 84, at 1637 (noting that a party's BATNA is flexible because the
party may reevaluate and amend its BATNA with the addition of information throughout
the negotiations).
95. Id. Of course, different representative groups may have different predictions as to
the unilateral agency outcome. Id. As a result, parties will have varied BATNAs. Id. For
example, a manufacturer might be interested in making a product for the least amount of
money, whereas a consumer group might be interested in the safety of the product. Conse-
quently, the parties may have different views of what might result if the agency promul-
gates the final regulation in the absence of negotiations.
96. See Harter, supra note 84, at 45 (explaining that a single party may have so much
influence that it would not have to compromise to attain its goals and, consequently, it
would have no reason to negotiate with other parties).
97. Id. at 45-46 (discussing the ability of one party to impose its will over other par-
ties); see Susskind & McMahon, supra note 15, at 139.
98. See Harter, supra note 84, at 45-46 (noting that seemingly powerless parties may
compensate with threats of delay or of instituting an action with a third party whose deci-
sion may not be easily predicted).
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team, those overwhelmed members will search for an alternative process
or forum in which to press their claims.99
Negotiated rulemaking in a practical agency process also depends on
the number of negotiators involved. 100 Harter determined that fifteen or
fewer participants should be the limit. 101 He speculated that if more than
fifteen negotiators were involved, too many interests would be repre-
sented and the process would break down. 102 Moreover, the issues to
which the negotiation is directed must be mature or " 'ripe' " for deci-
sion. 10 3 Hence, if the parties have not yet formulated their interests in
the issues involved in the negotiation or if the issues themselves are not
sufficiently identified, the process has not reached maturity." In this
formulative process, issues are not ripe because the parties are still in
their organizational stages and/or the substance of the negotiations has
not yet been solidified.'
0 5
Harter's fifth prerequisite to successful negotiated rulemaking is based
on the degree of urgency related to a decision. 106 If the decision on the
issue "is inevitable, or even better, imminent," negotiators are more
likely to engage in the required compromises and concessions necessary
to resolve the matter in an effort to avoid a decision made by others.1
1 7
The urgency created by the pressures of a deadline will prompt the fear
that an agency will take the decision-making process away from the nego-
tiators.'0 8 This fear will ultimately induce the negotiators to engage in
negotiations. 0 9
99. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 15, at 139.
100. Harter, supra note 84, at 46.
101. Id. at 46 & n.257. Harter's observation was driven primarily by his feeling that it
would be difficult to get more than 15 people around a table. Id. at 46 n.257. He did
concede, however, that more than that number have participated in negotiations. Id.: see 5
U.S.C. § 565(b) (Supp. V 1993) (limiting membership to 25 people unless the agency head
determined that more was necessary).
102. See Harter, supra note 84, at 46; cf id. at 46 n.258 (suggesting the use of caucuses
as a means to represent the interests of a number of different organizations).
103. Id. at 47 (emphasizing that negotiated rulemaking seeks to resolve issues and ac-
commodate interests, which necessarily mandates that the issues are able to be addressed).
104. Id. For negotiators, maturity means the ability to grasp the issues, the possible
solutions, and the implications of potential compromises. Id.
105. Id. (distinguishing the inability of a party to participate in a negotiation from the
issue not lending itself to agency consideration).
106. Id.
107. Id. In this context, inevitability means that, in the event that the negotiators do
not settle on a regulation, the agency will be required to act. Id.
108. Id. at 47-48.
109. Id. at 48. The parties are motivated to concede and negotiate by their desire to
retain control of the proceedings. id.
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Reiterating his first point, Harter also maintains that parties will par-
ticipate in negotiations only if they believe that they will be "better off for
having done so." 1  Negotiations that result in " 'zero sum games,' "
therefore, are unlikely to be successful.' because, as Harter initially
pointed out, parties will be attracted to the negotiation process only if
they believe that they will come away in a better position than had they
not participated in the process."' Thus, he notes, negotiators must be-
lieve that the dispute will result in a win-win situation." 3
Furthermore, when the subject matter of the negotiations involves
deeply held fundamental beliefs or values, the negotiations may come to
gridlock. 4 This phenomenon holds true because parties to the process
can find little or no room for compromise." 5 Basically, the more the
parties agree on the underlying fundamental principles that may have an
impact on their decisions, the greater their ability to negotiate the critical
issues in search of a resolution.
Another dimension of Harter's theory dictates that a negotiation will
have a greater potential for success if there is more than one issue on the
table. 16 Because parties come to a negotiation with concerns that are
weighted relative to their interests,1 7 they come ready to order those
interests and to determine their priorities in an effort to maximize their
potential for success.' 18 In contrast, with only one issue involved in the
regulation, there is virtually no room for give and take.' 9 This sets up a
zero sum games result, the classic situation in which one party wins and
the other loses, thus ultimately directing any negotiation to fail. 2
110. Id.
111. Id. Zero sum games are "situations in which one party wins only to the extent that
another loses." Id.
112. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
113. Harter, supra note 84, at 48-49. A win-win situation results when all parties are
better off for having negotiated. Id. at 48.
114. Id. at 49 (noting that "[i]f fundamental issues cannot be resolved, .... the situation
may closely resemble a debate over the superiority of various religions and the parties may
be unable to reach an agreement").
115. See id.; Perritt, supra note 84, at 1645. Here, Perritt illustrates the difficulties of
conflicting fundamental values in a situation where "a fundamentalist Baptist preacher and
an equally committed evolutionist" would have to negotiate a public school curriculum.
Perritt, supra note 84, at 1645 n.115.
116. See Harter, supra note 84, at 50.
117. Id.
118. Id. To maximize their overall interests, parties may improve higher priority issues
by yielding on lower priority issues. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. Fortunately, most regulations raise a variety of issues appropriate for negotiat-
ing, such as the extent of the problem, the manner of compliance, or the date of implemen-
tation. Id.
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Harter also contends that research should not be dispositive of the ne-
gotiation 12 1 because parties probably will not negotiate if the results of
the completed research or the research to be undertaken dictate the out-
come of the negotiation. 22 If research does determine the outcome,
there is no reason to negotiate a matter that is or would be decided based
on that research, 23 unless the research opens new negotiation positions
and further possibilities for compromise.' 24
Harter's last major point is that the parties will negotiate only if some
kind of effective implementation process is possible.1 25  Specifically,
negotiators must believe that the agency will utilize and implement the
results of their agreements.126 A contrary result would defeat the notion
that parties negotiate to better their position. 27
Harter's suggestions have been emulated in a report and recommenda-
tion presented to the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS),' 28 wherein regulatory negotiation has been recognized as an al-
ternative method of drafting regulations.' 29 The ACUS subsequently
adopted the proposal unanimously.' 30 While only a recommendation, it
is evident that there is discontent in the way that rules and regulations are
being drafted and implemented.
13 1
121. Id. at 50-51.
122. Id. Professor Harter notes that "when fundamental research is necessary, the out-
come is in substantial doubt, and the outcome [of that research] would dictate the regula-
tory result." Id. at 51. He points out that "a party may not wish to commit itself in
advance to accepting the results of such research." Id. at 50. On the other hand, the par-
ties may agree during negotiations that research is needed and may determine the protocol
for that research. Id. at 50-51. However, the results of that research must be fairly certain
or, in the alternative, they must "open up a range of regulatory alternatives." Id. at 51. In
other words, the research should not resolve issues involved in the negotiation. Id.
123. Id. at 50 (explaining that "[i]f one party controls information that bears directly on
a regulation, its power to control the outcome is greatly enhanced").
124. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
125. Harter, supra note 84, at 51.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
128. PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATING PROPOSED REGULATIONS, (Recommendation
No. 82-4), 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1993) [hereinafter Recommendation 82-4].
129. See Harter, supra note 84, at 112-13.
130. See Recommendation 82-4, supra note 128. In addition, Recommendation 82-4
describes the various stages of negotiation as set out by Professor Harter in his original
design and offers criteria to select appropriate subjects for negotiation. Id. The stages
include (1) assembling the negotiators, (2) the negotiations process, (3) achieving consen-
sus, (4) reporting the consensus to the agency, (5) agency action, and (6) judicial review.
Id.
131. See id. The introductory comments to Recommendation 82-4 discuss the increas-
ing formalization of the rulemaking process, the institutionalizing effect on adversarial re-
lationships among interested parties, and the resulting extensive factual records, long
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IV. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING IN PRACTICE
Notwithstanding ACUS's unanimous endorsement of negotiated
rulemaking as an alternative means for drafting regulations, it was con-
cerned about whether negotiated rulemaking could withstand the scru-
tiny of the courts. 132 For example, agency delegation could be one issue
questioned. According to the delegation doctrine, policy decisions ought
to be made only by accountable officials; 133 however, negotiated
rulemaking arguably takes that power and places it in the hands of people
who are not accountable." In addition, some opponents to negotiated
rulemaking also suggest that the policy against ex parte communication
would limit the effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking. 135 Perhaps the
strongest argument against negotiated rulemaking concerns its effect on
the Federal Advisory Committee Act 136 (FACA), and the many ways that
it potentially contravenes FACA.
137
delays, and, very often, parties who are dissatisfied with the outcome of the rulemaking
proceedings. Id.
132. See id. The introductory comments to Recommendation 82-4 suggest this concern
through a seemingly prophetic assertion that the recommended procedures would "ensure
that affected interests have the opportunity to participate, that the resulting rule is within
the discretion delegated by Congress, and that it is not arbitrary or capricious."
133. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 380-81 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.
1970); see also Perritt, supra note 14, at 480-82 (discussing how negotiated rulemaking may
seem to violate the delegation doctrine, but in fact does not).
134. See Perritt, supra note 14, at 480 (stating that if an agency delegates its rulemaking
power to private citizens, delegation problems arise because private citizens are less ac-
countable to the public than agency officials).
135. See id. at 484-88 (concluding that negotiated rulemaking potentially could contra-
dict the policy against ex parte communication between parties and decision makers). Ex
parte contacts are forbidden during the formal rulemaking process. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d),
557(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
136. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Congress enacted the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act in 1972 because of rising concerns over the use of advisory commit-
tees by administrative agencies. See id. app. § 2; see also Perritt, supra note 84, at 1703.
The findings and purpose section of the statute states that Congress found that: (1) the
need for advisory committees had not been reviewed adequately; (2) new committees
should be established only when needed and their numbers should be kept to a minimum;
(3) advisory committees should be terminated once they have fulfilled their purpose; (4)
standard and uniform procedures should govern the establishment, operation, administra-
tion, and duration of advisory committees; (5) Congress and the public should be kept
informed with respect to the number, purpose, membership, activities, and cost of the com-
mittees, and (6) committees should serve only in an advisory capacity. 5 U.S.C. app.
§ 2(b)(1)-(6).
137. In its final form, FACA requires an advisory committee to: (1) be chartered with
the appropriate government office or personnel, (2) be used only for advisory purposes, (3)
have meetings that are open to the public, (4) publish a timely notice in the Federal Regis-
ter revealing the committee's schedule of meetings, and (5) make detailed notes at all
meetings. Id. app. §§ 9(c), 9(b), 10(a)(1), 10(a)(2), 10(c). In effect, FACA regulates the
creation, composition, and general function of advisory committees. Clearly, the require-
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Fortunately, these and other potential problems have not surfaced in
the attempts at negotiated rulemaking by several agencies.1 38 Hence, a
review of some of the triumphs and failures of negotiated rulemaking is
instructive for purposes of its application to the failed Subchapter S
regulation.
A. Agency Successes
Between 1983 and 1985, three different agencies utilized negotiated
rulemaking on four significant occasions.' 39 Three of these negotiations
reached consensus, while the fourth one was adjourned. One successful
use of negotiated rulemaking occurred with the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration's (FAA) revision of the flight-and-duty time regulations for air-
line personnel. 14  At issue was the maximum number of hours or periods
of service in which airmen and other employees of airlines could be en-
gaged.141 Because old restrictive regulations failed to meet changing
technology of air travel, the FAA tried on numerous occasions to use the
traditional rulemaking process to develop proposed revisions. 142 None of
these attempts, however, succeeded in resolving the myriad of issues to
the satisfaction of all parties.' 43 Finally, in 1983, the FAA decided to at-
tempt negotiated rulemaking.144
Pursuant to FACA, the agency published a notice in the Federal Regis-
ter of its intent to negotiate the regulation through the use of an advisory
ments for advisory committee formation and open meetings conflict with some of the es-
sential structural requirements for negotiated rulemaking. Hence, direct application of
FACA to negotiated rulemaking could defeat or severely limit negotiated rulemaking's
chance for success.
138. See infra notes 139-214 and accompanying text; see also Perritt, supra note 84, at
1695-96 (noting that another difficulty perceived by opponents of negotiated rulemaking is
the potential conflicts between the informality of the process and judicial review). This
potential conflict is due partially to the increased growth of hybrid rulemaking and its need
for a more formal evidentiary base upon which the rule is promulgated. Perritt, supra note
84, at 1696. Commentators also have suggested that there could be challenges under sec-
tion 706 of the APA, which "allows a court to overturn a rule if the agency's action was
'arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion.' " Id. at 1701 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(1988)).
139. See infra notes 140-54, 155-61, 162-70, 171-214 and accompanying text.
140. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,136 (1984) (to be codified at
14 C.F.R. pts. 121 & 135) (proposed Mar. 28, 1984).
141. Id. at 12,136.
142. Id. at 12,136, 12,137 & n.1 (reflecting that within the prior six years alone, four
separate attempts to reform the rules had been made).
143. Id. at 12,136-37 (identifying the complexity and inflexibility of the existing rules as
well as the change in the character and growth of the air transportation industry as factors
necessitating a change in the existing rules).
144. Id. at 12,137. The FAA created an advisory committee, which met for 16 days in
1983 to discuss the major issues regarding flight-and-duty time regulations. Id.
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committee. 145 The notice identified the convener/mediator for the nego-
tiations and requested interested parties to comment on advisory commit-
tee membership, issue formulation, and procedural matters. 146 The
notice made clear that the agency intended to promulgate a rule even if
the negotiation process failed'47 and incorporated provisions for inter-
ested parties to request inclusion in the process.148 Ultimately, the FAA
established an advisory committee, primarily consisting of various airline
companies, associations, and the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters.'
49
As with any group decision, the advisory committee probably faced
many stumbling points during the process but the FAA was eventually
able to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), which gave
interested parties forty-five days to comment. 150 After the FAA and the
advisory committee reviewed and addressed the comments received,' 5 '
they successfully reached an agreement on a proposed rule in March 1984
and promulgated the final rule in July 1985.152
It is important to recognize the various factors that led to the success of
this negotiation. The most significant factors include: the limited number
of interests (ultimately eighteen participants were involved); the absence
of issues involving fundamental value questions; and the ripeness of the
issues for discussion. 153 It also was obvious to the participants that prior
FAA regulations had been unacceptable; therefore, there were present
and pressing incentives to negotiate.
154
145. Notice of Intent to Form Advisory Committee for Regulatory Negotiation, 48 Fed.
Reg. 21,339 (1983) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 121 & 135) (proposed May 12, 1983)
(stating that the committee would address flight, duty, and rest time requirements for crew
members).
146. Id. at 21,339-40.
147. Id. at 21,340 (stating that "the agency would issue a new [notice for proposed
rulemaking] based upon the complete regulatory record including the record of this
process").
148. Id. at 21,341. The FAA, however, limited the number of participants to 15. Id.
149. Notice of Establishment of Advisory Committee for Regulatory Negotiation and
Notice of First Meeting, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,771, 29,772 (1983). The FAA scheduled the first
meeting of the advisory committee for June 29, 1983. Id.
150. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,136 (1984) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pts. 121 & 135) (proposed Mar. 28, 1984).
151. Final Rule, 50 Fed Reg. 29,306 (1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 121 & 135).
152. Id. (explaining that "[tihe final rule [was] the result of FAA consideration of all
comments on the NPRM and of the final deliberations of the Advisory Committee").
153. See id. Thus, the circumstances under which the FAA conducted this rulemaking
met several of Harter's criteria for success. See supra notes 100-05, 114-15 and accompa-
nying text.
154. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (stating that Harter's most important
criteria for successful negotiated rulemaking is that the parties feel they have more to gain
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At about the same time, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
was using negotiated rulemaking in two different settings. The EPA's first
effort was in developing an NPRM on noncompliance penalties under
section 206(g) of the Clean Air Act.1 55 Overall, the EPA established the
advisory committee in basically the same manner as the FAA negotia-
tion 156 and the negotiations began in June and ended in October 1985.157
The EPA conducted the negotiations under the requisite FACA charter
with notice in the Federal Register of the meeting dates and the fact that
the negotiations were open to the public.'58 In the end, the committee
reached a consensus on the issues that had been identified for discussion
and resolution, and was able to submit a proposal for rulemaking.159
Subsequently, the EPA published the proposal in the Federal Register t1 6
accompanied by little comment and the first phase of the noncompliance
penalty rules were promulgated in final form later that year.16 1
The EPA's second success with negotiated rulemaking came in the
form of exemptions from pesticide regulations. Specifically, section 18 of
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
granted the EPA administrator discretionary authority to exempt a fed-
eral or state agency from the provisions of FIFRA if the agency met cer-
from negotiating than not); see also Perritt, supra note 84, at 1670-71. In his article, Perritt
notes the FAA's summary in the Federal Register with respect to the resulting rule:
"The committee ... thoroughly discussed the major issues involved in the regula-
tion of flight time limits. Numerous proposals and justifications were drafted by
participants and submitted to the committee for review .... Although the com-
mittee did not reach consensus on any particular proposal, its deliberations were
successful because committee members gave serious consideration to and entered
into candid discussion of the various proposals and justifications submitted to
them. Thus the committee succeeded in narrowing the differences among parties
and in reaching substantial agreement on some issues. In addition, the committee
identified major areas of concern and all parties obtained significant, new infor-
mation on a subject which has been discussed, without resolution, for years."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,136,
12,137 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 121 & 135)).
155. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 50 Fed. Reg. 9204 (1985) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 86) (proposed Mar. 6, 1985).
156. Compare id. at 9204-05 (explaining that the EPA established the advisory commit-
tee according to FACA) with supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text (revealing that the
FAA established the advisory committee according to proper FACA procedure).
157. See 50 Fed. Reg. at 9205.
158. Id. at 9205.
159. Id. at 9204 (stating that the "proposal [was] based upon the consensus that was
reached during the Regulatory Negotiation process").
160. Id.
161. Final Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,374 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86) (noting
that only thirteen comments were received).
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tain conditions.162  Although regulations implementing that section
already existed,163 concerns about their use or potential misuse 6 4
prompted the EPA to utilize negotiated rulemaking as the procedure to
develop new regulations.
165
Pursuant to the normal course of events, the EPA selected a convener
to handle prenegotiation operations166 and appointed an in-house
facilitator to help the negotiation process. 167 Consistent with its first ef-
fort under the Clean Air Act, a Federal Register notice announced the
convening of the committee, identified the potential issues, and invited
requests for participation. 16s The committee began negotiations in Sep-
tember 1984 and by January 1985 the committee reached full consensus
on the preamble and text of the NPRM, which was subsequently pub-
lished in April 1985.169 The EPA received comments and published the
final rule in 1986 with little change.17°
B. Agency Failure
The last of the four major negotiation efforts began in 1983 and in-
volved the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
162. 7 U.S.C § 136p (1988 & Supp V 1993) (allowing exemptions in cases where, after
consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture and the governor of any state, the EPA
Administrator determines that an emergency warrants an exemption).
163. 40 C.F.R. § 166 (1985).
164. Proposed Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 13,944 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 166)
(proposed Apr. 8, 1985) (stating that in its audit of these regulations, the EPA cited the
regulations' complexity, inefficiency, and lack of standards to determine emergency ex-
emptions as concerns); see also Susskind & McMahon, supra note 15, at 147 (noting that
the dramatic increase in the number of exemptions requested caused concerns that states
and industries were using exemptions to improperly circumvent the regulations). See gen-
erally EPA Pesticide Regulatory Program Study: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Depart-
ment Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on Agriculture,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1983) (discussing congressional concern about the marked increase
in the number of requests for exemptions).
165. 50 Fed. Reg. at 13,944.
166. A convener is "a person who impartially assists an agency in determining whether
establishment of a negotiated rulemaking committee is feasible and appropriate in a partic-
ular rulemaking [proceeding]." 5 U.S.C. § 562(3) (Supp. V 1993); see also Harter, supra
note 84, at 70 (explaining that the convenor would be responsible for a "preliminary deter-
mination of the feasibility of negotiation, the interests to be represented, and the appropri-
ate representatives of the interests").
167. A facilitator (or mediator) is "a person who impartially aids in the discussions and
negotiations among the members of a negotiated rulemaking committee to develop a pro-
posed rule." 5 U.S.C. § 562(4); see also Harter, supra note 84, at 79 (explaining that the
facilitator should "facilitate discussions between the interested parties without taking a
position").
168. 49 Fed. Reg. 31,145 (1984).
169. Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 1896 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 166).
170. Id.
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OSHA was attempting to develop a revised standard for workplace expo-
sure to benzene. 1' This task ultimately proved to be unsuccessful, due in
part to the baggage brought to the negotiation as evidenced by the
stormy history of the regulation.
172
In 1971, OSHA promulgated an industry-wide standard for benzene
exposure.' 73 Nonetheless, due to growing concerns for the health risks
associated with the gas, many interested parties requested a stricter stan-
dard. 74 In response to those requests, OSHA issued voluntary guide-
lines that eventually resulted in the promulgation of an emergency
temporary standard . 75 The restrictive nature of the emergency standard,
however, led to judicial challenges 176 and, consequently, OSHA never
implemented it. Although OSHA proposed this same standard again and
eventually issued it in final form,1 7 7 it was similarly challenged and invali-
dated.17 ' According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, OSHA provided insufficient evidence to support its findings in
the administrative record; the Supreme Court agreed.'79 The controversy
over benzene continued until finally, in 1983, OSHA conceded to pres-
sure and decided to expedite the issuance of a new permanent stan-
dard. 180 After considering the time frame it had set for formulating a
171. Request for Information, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,412 (1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1910).
172. See Proposed Rule and Notice of Hearing, 50 Fed. Reg. 50,512, 50,514-15 (1985)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed Dec. 10, 1985) (discussing the history of
the benzene regulation); see also Perritt, supra note 14, at 498-99 (explaining that the par-
ties involved in the negotiation could not agree to certain issues).
173. The EPA implemented this standard as the Emergency Temporary Standard for
Occupational Exposure to Benzene. See 50 Fed. Reg. 50,512 (1985). The Secretary of
OSHA established it under power granted in section 6(a) of OSHA. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)
(1988); see 50 Fed. Reg. at 50,515.
174. Emergency Temporary Standard; Notice of Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,516, 22,516-
17 (1977) (proposed May 3, 1977).
175. Id. at 22,516.
176. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub
nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); see also
Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 973-74 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (discussing the
filing challenge to an OSHA regulation).
177. Perritt, supra note 84, at 1648.
178. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 (1980).
179. American Petroleum Inst., 581 F.2d at 504-05; Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at
639-40 (adding that OSHA had the burden to show through substantial evidence that the
limit was "reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material
health impairment").
180. See Perritt, supra note 84, at 1650 (explaining that prior to the expedited issuance
of a new standard, OSHA had denied a petition for a temporary emergency one).
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regulation that was acceptable to all parties,181 OSHA decided to use ne-
gotiated rulemaking to issue a new permanent standard.
The negotiations began in the summer of 1983 with healthy skepticism
as to the chances of a successful outcome.' 82 This skepticism was due in
part to the diversity of interests present at the negotiations, many of
which were in absolute conflict with one another.18 3 For example, labor
favored the minimum amount of exposure for its workers, while the steel
industry acknowledged that it was difficult to stay within the fairly wide
parameters of the 1971 regulation."8 Several other contingencies fa-
vored a standard that was less restrictive than the one that had been in-
validated by the Supreme Court, but more restrictive than the existing
standard.'85 In addition, speculation about benzene's actual effect on
health contributed to the difficulties in reaching a consensus.18 6 In the
end, OSHA discontinued the negotiations and formulated a new NPRM
that it released in 1985.187
The reasons for the failure of the negotiations are significant because
other agencies may examine OSHA's attempt to employ negotiated
rulemaking before embarking on their own experiment. Among the
questions that may be asked about the negotiations, one particularly im-
portant query is whether this set of regulations was an appropriate candi-
date for the negotiation process. It also is important to consider what
other dynamics ultimately led to the failure. Does Harter's theory of ne-
gotiated rulemaking explain or suggest a reason for the outcome both
from a procedural and a social interactive stand point? In the totality of
the circumstances, was the end result probable and perhaps even
predictable?
181. See Perritt, supra note 84, at 1650-51. Basically, the time frame was to "add [the]
benzene standard to [OSHA's] 'regulatory agenda' by June, 1983; submit a proposed stan-
dard to the OMB by November, 1983; publish a proposed standard in the Federal Register
by December, 1983; hold a fact-finding hearing by February, 1984; and publish the final
standard by June, 1984." Id. at 1650 (footnote omitted).
182. Id. (stating that the parties themselves were very doubtful about the success of the
negotiations).
183. Id. at 1657-58 (noting that "[m]ost of the industry participants in the benzene ne-
gotiations worked in the health and safety functions of regulated enterprises or trade
associations").
184. Id. at 1651. In particular, the steel industry favored a standard that exposed work-
ers to 10 times more benzene than the proposed standard to which labor had agreed. Id.
185. Id. The petroleum and chemical industries thought they could accept a benzene
level between those favored by the steel and labor industries. Id.
186. Id. (noting the difference in opinion as to the reliability of scientific data by labor
and industry).
187. Proposed Rule and Notice of Hearing, 50 Fed. Reg. 50,512 (1985) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed Dec. 10, 1985). OSHA eventually promulgated a final
rule on September 11, 1993. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1993).
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In considering whether the OSHA regulation was an appropriate can-
didate for negotiation, it appears that the negatives outweighed the posi-
tives. First, as previously noted, people will come to the bargaining table
only if they believe that negotiation will lead to a better result than the
traditional rulemaking process.188 Additionally, as noted by Professor
Perritt, there was a degree of skepticism as to the potential for the negoti-
ations to move to consensus. 189 It appears that the negotiators were will-
ing to "try anything" because of substantial pressure from then OSHA
Assistant Secretary of Labor Thorne G. Auchter to negotiate,' 90 and be-
cause of the seven years of frustration in trying to use the traditional APA
rulemaking method. In short, the climate at the outset left something to
be desired.
Regarding the concerns of maturity, 19' it appears that the issues in this
case were "overripe" for decision because there had been multiple at-
tempts at promulgating a standard and numerous failures,1 92 the last of
which resulted in a divided Supreme Court decision.' 93 Moreover, nego-
tiators likely were entrenched in their positions, due in part to the numer-
ous informational documents that OSHA had created in the course of
extensive pre-negotiation activity.19 4 Consequently, the participants had
to assimilate the data to effectively discuss the issues. Thus, it appears
that trade-offs' 95 would have been more difficult than in a negotiation in
which the participants were building a record and had more flexible
positions.
Furthermore, one could argue that a benzene standard flirts with Har-
ter's construct regarding fundamental values because of the health impli-
cations for exposed workers. 96 Implementation' 97 also could pose a
problem in light of the Supreme Court's unwillingness to approve a re-
duction of the amount of benzene in the air (10 parts benzene per million
parts of air-10 ppm to 1 ppm) without a showing that the exposure limit
188. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
189. Perritt, supra note 84, at 1650. One of the major forces, the petroleum industry,
doubted whether negotiation was a good idea at all. Id. at 1651.
190. Id. at 1650.
191. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
193. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 (1980).
194. Perritt, supra note 84, at 1653.
195. See Harter, supra note 84, at 50 (stating that negotiations are most effective when
"the parties affected by a decision can identify the issues involved, scale their respective
importance, trade positions, and work out novel approaches in an effort to maximize their
overall interests").
196. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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was reasonably necessary to provide a safe workplace. 198 Therefore, the
possibility that judicial review would overturn the standard would make
such implementation problematic at best.
A final negative factor in applying negotiated rulemaking to OSHA
regulations is premised on the fact that the issues central to the negotia-
tion were technical in nature. 199 As such, the standard was influenced
necessarily by objective data rather than discussion and compromise.
On the positive side, having failed to successfully apply the traditional
method of rulemaking, OSHA did seek negotiated rulemaking as an ave-
nue to forge the regulations. Also, a finite number of parties were in-
volved in the process2"' with balanced countervailing powers.2 °' These
parties had the ability to discuss several issues, creating the potential for
trade-offs.
202
In considering other dynamics of the OSHA negotiations, it is clear
that the process was the product of unforeseeable happenstance and the
result of poor planning. For example, midway through the negotiations,
the Assistant Secretary of OSHA resigned.20 3 Another unforeseeable
problem was the apparent change in the political climate during the nego-
tiations period, such that a negotiated standard potentially would have
appeared to favor the steel industry.20 4
In retrospect, one major reason for the failure of the negotiations was
OSHA's lack of participation in the process. There appears to be no ex-
planation of the agency's failure to participate, other than members of the
health staff personnel and their legal staff had little confidence that the
process would be successful. 205 In short, OSHA was not committed to
198. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 (1980).
199. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (noting that such issues often re-
quire objective data).
200. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. Over the course of several prior
years, labor organizations promoted a lower exposure standard, while industry, afraid that
its constituents could not meet those standards, promoted a higher exposure standard.
Perritt, supra note 84, at 1651. The Supreme Court found that OSHA failed to show that a
lower benzene standard was reasonably necessary or appropriate, while indicating that a
higher benzene standard could be upheld once OSHA made such a showing. Industrial
Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 630-38.
202. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
203. Perritt, supra note 84, at 1659. Many perceived Assistant Secretary Auchter to be
the power behind the organization of the negotiation. Id. at 1662. The parties also relied
upon him to ensure that OSHA would unilaterally issue a regulation if the negotiations
failed. Id.
204. Id. (discussing the emergence of labor's cooperation with the Reagan
administration).
205. Id. at 1655.
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the process from the outset.2 °6 As a result of OSHA's nonparticipation,
the negotiators had little guidance as to what kind of compromise the
agency would accept. 20 7 Moreover, the agency's veto power 20 8 left open
the possibility of complete failure of the process.
Another potential problem for the negotiation was OSHA's distribu-
tion of a draft standard during the negotiations.20 9 While nothing in the
draft came as a surprise, the disclosure of OSHA's position on the issues
may have effectively solidified positions at a time in the negotiations
when open-mindedness may have better served the parties. 210 As previ-
ously stated, OSHA adjourned the negotiated rulemaking committee and
in late 1985, published its own NPRM with respect to limiting benzene
exposure in the workplace.21'
Despite OSHA's failure with negotiated rulemaking to set benzene
standards, OSHA and other federal agencies used this process in some
form since the early 1980s.212 Because substantial questions remained
about the application of FACA and other federal statutes, Congress be-
206. Id.
207. See Harter, supra note 84, at 60. Harter stated that "[a]gency nonparticipation ...
adversely affects the definition of the boundaries of the discussions, because the parties are
either insufficiently aware of the boundaries or the boundaries are too rigid." Id.
208. See Perritt, supra note 84, at 1666.
209. Id. at 1661-62. Professor Perritt, however, acknowledges his research indicated
that some members of the team thought that the draft standard was helpful. Id. at 1662
n.190.
210. Id. at 1662 (explaining that the draft solidified party positions and lessened the
chances of consensus).
211. Proposed Rule and Notice of Hearing, 50 Fed. Reg. 50,512 (1985) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed Dec. 10, 1985).
212. OSHA used a form of negotiation to resolve certain issues when promulgating a
regulation that limited exposure to cotton dust. See Perritt, supra note 84, at 1682-83. The
actual rulemaking followed the normal hearing and comment process, but the interested
parties used negotiation when they disagreed on several key points. Id. at 1683. OSHA
also employed negotiation when dealing with coke oven emission regulations, as well as
regulations setting standards for exposure to MDA (methylendedianiline). See Notice of
Intent to Form Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee to Develop a Proposed Rule:
Request for Representation, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,789 (1985) (using negotiations to set MDA
standards); Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 42,836 (1983) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (same). The Federal Trade Commission used negotiated
rulemaking to revise their informal dispute settlement procedures. Notice of Intent to
Form Advisory Committee for Regulatory Negotiation, 51 Fed. Reg. 5205 (1986) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 703). The EPA also has actively used the process to forge consen-
sus on environmental issues. See, e.g., Notice, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,739 (1986) (using negotia-
tions to amend regulations governing major and minor modifications to RCRA permits);
Notice, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,401 (1986) (using negotiations to set hazardous waste injection
restrictions).
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gan to examine the possibility of codifying the process213 and ultimately
enacted the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.214
V. CODIFICATION OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
On June 23, 1987, Congress first attempted to codify negotiated
rulemaking with Senate Bill 1504.215 After the Senate passed Senate Bill
1504 on September 30, 1988,216 the House of Representatives began to
examine the matter; however, the 100th Congress adjourned with the
House taking no action on the bill.217 Eventually, Congress introduced
Senate Bill 303218 and House Bill 743219 on January 31, 1989, which were
considered by the Senate Government Affairs Committee and the House
Judiciary Committee, respectively. Finally on November 29, 1990, the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 (Act or Negotiated Rulemaking
213. See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
214. Pub. L. No. 101-648, § 3(a), 104 Stat. 4969, 4970 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570
(Supp. V 1993)). Provisions began to appear in various bills, on an ad hoc basis, directing
agencies to use negotiated rulemaking. For example, the Augustus F. Hawkins and Robert
T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Act of 1988 directs the Secre-
tary of Education to use negotiation to develop regulations required by the Act. 20 U.S.C.
§ 2831 (1988). The Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 also directs the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to use negotiated rulemaking to resolve certain indemnification
issues involving radiopharmaceuticals. Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988)).
215. S. 1504, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The bill itself states that its purpose is -'[t]o
provide for an alternative to the present adversarial rulemaking procedure by establishing
a process to facilitate the formation of negotiated rulemaking committees." Id.
216. 137 CONG. REC. S13760-66 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1988).
217. The fact that the House did not act on the bill was attributed to "the crush of last
minute business." 135 CONG. REC. S1262 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Levin).
218. S. 303, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). While S. 303 incorporated much of the lan-
guage of its predecessor S. 1504, there were some notable changes. First, S. 303 "sim-
plifie[d] and strengthen[ed] the language requiring agencies that sponsor negotiated
rulemaking committees to comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act." S. REP.
No. 97, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989). Second, "it place[d] the key provision of the bill in
Title 5 of the U.S. Code, in the chapter on administrative rulemaking." Id. at 8. Third, it
made clear that in the judicial review process, regulations promulgated by negotiation "are
to be accorded no greater deference by a court than" those of other rulemaking proce-
dures. Id. Fourth, Congress added language "requiring agencies to publish a notice in the
Federal Register of an intent to establish a negotiated rulemaking committee," and lan-
guage requiring that such notice "explain how a person may apply, or nominate another
person, for membership on the committee." Id. Finally, the Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee made general revisions to correct typographical errors, to change minor words, and
to clarify that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service had authority to assist other
federal agencies conducting negotiated rulemakings. Id.
219. H.R. 743, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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Act) became law. 2 ° Its various components encompassed many of the
basic tenants developed through the experience of different agencies as
shown in the following discussion.
A. The Purpose of the Law
The primary purpose of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 "is to
establish a framework for the conduct of negotiated rulemaking ... to
encourage agencies to use the process when it enhances the informal
rulemaking process."2'' As noted in the report submitted by the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, this purpose "contains two cave-
ats.",222 First, the Act encourages the use of negotiated rulemaking only if
it would enhance the informal rulemaking process.22 3 Second, it recog-
nizes that one of the most valuable qualities of the process "is its flexibil-
ity and adaptability to the exigencies of particular rulemakings. 2 2 4 Thus,
the Act clarifies the procedural issues involved in negotiated rulemaking
while allowing "continued experimentation with th[e] process. ,225
B. Whether to Form a Negotiated Rulemaking Committee
In section 563, the Act states that a committee should be assembled
when "the head of an agency determines that the use of the negotiated
rulemaking procedure is in the public interest., 226 To aid in this decision
making, the Act provides a list of seven basic factors to consider.227
220. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (Supp. V
1993)).
221. 5 U.S.C. § 561 (Supp. V 1993).
222. S. REP. No. 97, at 9.
223. Id. This caveat recognizes "that negotiated rulemaking is not appropriate in every
or even most rulemaking situations" and should not be used "to replace conventional
rulemaking procedures." Id.
224. Id. By establishing basic rules for the process, instead of inflexible requirements,
the Act creates a framework for implementing negotiated rulemaking. Id.
225. Id.
226. 5 U.S.C. § 563(a) (Supp. V 1993).
227. Id. The agency head must consider whether:
(1) there is a need for a rule;
(2) there are a limited number of identifiable interests that will be significantly
affected by the rule;
(3) there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee can be convened with a
balanced representation of persons who-
(A) can adequately represent the interests identified under paragraph (2);
and
(B) are willing to negotiate in good faith to reach a consensus on the pro-
posed rule;
(4) there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee will reach a consensus on
the proposed rule within a fixed period of time;
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Rather than attempting to be comprehensive, these considerations should
serve as a guide for the agency head in determining whether negotiated
rulemaking is suitable for a particular case.228 In addition to these fac-
tors, the Act also authorizes the agency to use the services of a convener
to determine whether to form a negotiated rulemaking committee. 12 9
Specifically, a convener assists the agency in designating which persons
would be most affected by the rule. 3 ° Through discussions with those
interested persons, the convener then examines their concerns and at-
tempts to determine whether it is both practical and suitable to form a
negotiated rulemaking committee for a particular rulemaking exercise.
23'
Afterwards, the convener reports the findings along with recommenda-
tions on these matters to the agency.2 32 In responding to this report and
recommendations, the agency may ask the convener to locate and iden-
tify persons who would be "willing and qualified to represent the interests
that will be significantly affected by the proposed rule., 233 The convener,
therefore, acts as an information gatherer and soundboard for the parties
involved in the potential negotiation.
If the agency decides to form a negotiated rulemaking committee, the
agency is required to publish that decision in the Federal Register and, if
necessary, other specialized publications.234 By publishing a notice, an
agency ensures that all parties affected by the proposed rule will be in-
(5) the negotiated rulemaking procedure will not unreasonably delay the no-
tice of proposed rulemaking and the issuance of the final rule;
(6) the agency has adequate resources and is willing to commit such resources,
including technical assistance, to the committee; and
(7) the agency, to the maximum extent possible consistent with the legal obli-
gations of the agency, will use the consensus of the committee with respect to the
proposed rule as the basis for the rule proposed by the agency for notice and
comment.
Id. § 563(a)(1) to (7).
228. S. REP. No. 97, at 11-12. Because negotiated rulemaking requires willing and vol-
untary participation by all affected interests, it necessitates the ability of those affected to
choose a representative to negotiate in good faith on a rule for which the agency has
agreed to find and render assistance. Id. at 12.
229. 5 U.S.C. § 563(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
230. Id. § 563(b)(1)(A).
231. Id. § 563(b)(1)(B).
232. Id. § 563(b)(2). Additionally, "[t]he report and any recommendations of the con-
vener shall be made available to the public upon request." Id.
233. Id. Interested parties may include "residents of rural areas." Id.
234. 5 U.S.C. § 564(a)(1) to -(8) (Supp. V 1993). The notice should contain:
(1) an announcement that the agency intends to establish a negotiated
rulemaking committee to negotiate and develop a proposed rule;
(2) a description of the subject and scope of the rule to be developed, and the
issues to be considered;
(3) a list of the interests which are likely to be significantly affected by the rule;
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volved in the process, thereby improving the chances of a successful
negotiation.
235
To effectuate the goals of public notice, section 564(b) of the Act pro-
vides that persons who believe their interests have not been properly rep-
resented "may apply for, or nominate another person for, membership on
the... committee. ''236 Furthermore, the agency must allow at least thirty
calendar days for the receipt of applications or nominees as well as com-
ments on the formation of the committee and its proposed
membership.237
The question of whether to establish a negotiated rulemaking commit-
tee depends upon the evaluation of the comments and applications sub-
mitted.238 If the agency determines that a negotiated rulemaking process
is feasible and appropriate and the interests of all parties affected by the
proposed rule can be properly represented by the negotiated rulemaking
committee, then a committee will be appointed by the agency head.239
(4) a list of the persons proposed to represent such interests and the person or
persons proposed to represent the agency;
(5) a proposed agenda and schedule for completing the work of the committee,
including a target date for publication by the agency of a proposed rule for notice
and comment;
(6) a description of administrative support for the committee to be provided by
the agency, including technical assistance;
(7) a solicitation for comments on the proposal to establish the committee, and
the proposed membership of the negotiated rulemaking committee; and
(8) an explanation of how a person may apply or nominate another person for
membership on the committee, as provided under subsection (b).
Id.
235. S. REP. No. 97, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1989) (explaining that if "representation
for all significantly affected interests" does not exist, "the very problems of adversarial
relationships and rulemaking litigation" that negotiated rulemaking is supposed to avoid
will materialize).
236. 5 U.S.C. § 564(b) (Supp V 1993). This section specifies that each application or
nomination must include:
(1) the name of the applicant or nominee and a description of the interests
such person shall represent;
(2) evidence that the applicant or nominee is authorized to represent parties
related to the interests the person proposes to represent;
(3) a written commitment that the applicant or nominee shall actively partici-
pate in good faith in the development of the rule under consideration; and
(4) the reasons that the persons specified in the notice under subsection (a)(4)
do not adequately represent the interests of the person submitting the application
or nomination.
Id. § 564(1) to -(4).
237. Id. § 564(c).
238. 5 U.S.C. § 565(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
239. Id. The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs explained that "this determi-
nation must take into consideration all of the comments received from the public as well as
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While the committee generally will be limited to twenty-five members, at
least one member of the committee must represent the agency, 40
thereby, emphasizing that the agencies must actively participate in the
process rather than remaining passive and neutral.2 4' On the other hand,
if the agency decides not to form a negotiated rulemaking committee, its
decision and the reasons supporting it must promptly be published in the
Federal Register. 42
Assuming a negotiated rulemaking committee is formed, the agency
must comply with the FACA,143 "except as otherwise provided." 4
Although prior to the enactment of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of
1990 there had been questions concerning FACA's applicability to negoti-
ated rulemaking and its potential for disrupting the negotiation pro-
cess,2 45 the matter has been settled in favor of FACA's applicability.2
46
Consequently, any perceived notions that FACA may potentially inter-
fere with the negotiated rulemaking process must be left to future
negotiations.2 47
the factors listed in Section 563." S. REP. No. 97. at 16; see also supra note 227 (listing the
section 563 factors). The decision also "should include careful consideration of any find-
ings or recommendations made by a convener." Id.
240. 5 U.S.C. § 565(b).
241. S. REP. No. 97, at 17-18.
242. 5 U.S.C. § 565(a)(2).
243. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
244. 5 U.S.C. § 565(a)(1). The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs stated that
while negotiated rulemaking committees appear to have had little trouble complying with
FACA, these committees would benefit from the two limited exceptions to FACA found in
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990. S. REP. No. 97, at 17. According to the Senate
committee report, the Act's first exception "provides more flexible rules for terminating a
negotiated rulemaking committee, as explained in relation to Section [567]." Id. The sec-
ond exception "provides different rules for agency reimbursement of committee member
expenses, as discussed in relation to Section [568]." Id. The committee report concludes
that "[it is to accommodate these two exceptions that Section [5651 requires agencies es-
tablishing negotiated rulemaking committees to comply with FACA, 'except as otherwise
provided in this subchapter.' " Id.
245. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (explaining that FACA's requirements
for advisory committee formation and open meetings are in conflict with some of the es-
sential structural provisions for negotiated rulemaking).
246. See S. REP. No. 97, at 16-17 (noting that the Act states "unequivocally that negoti-
ated rulemaking committees are subject to FACA").
247. Id. The Committee report paints a glowing picture of the interface between
FACA and the Rulemaking Act. For example, FACA's requirement that advisory commit-
tees be balanced in viewpoint dovetails with the statute's requirement that negotiated
rulemaking committees reflect all interests that will be significantly affected by the rule.
Id. The issue of open meetings is not discussed except to say that because FACA applies,
negotiated rulemaking committees must observe standard operating procedures on such
subjects as finances, recordkeeping, and the Government in Sunshine Act. Id. The un-
resolved issue is whether subgroups or caucuses within the negotiated rulemaking commit-
tee are subject to the open meeting requirement. An argument can be made that they may
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C. Committee and Agency Conduct
Once formed under section 566 of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, the
negotiated rulemaking committee must consider the matter proposed by
the agency and attempt to reach agreement on a corresponding rule to be
proposed.248 Section 566 also further defines the role of the agency rep-
resentative as a member of a particular negotiated rulemaking commit-
tee.249 Specifically, individuals representing the agency are required to
participate in committee deliberations and activities and are entitled to
all of the same privileges and burdens of other committee members, in-
cluding the authority to fully represent the agency throughout the pro-
ceedings.250 Yet, despite an agency representative's authority to
represent an agency during the negotiations and discussions of the com-
mittee, the agency itself retains the right to make the final decision re-
garding acceptance of a proposed rule.251 To temper an agency's
independent decision making power, the Act also requires the agency to
consider any rule arrived at through a consensus of the committee and, to
the greatest extent possible, to base its proposed rule on the committee's
findings.252 Nevertheless, the Act does not state clearly what the out-
come would be should the agency decide not to publish the rule arrived at
by a consensus of the committee.
be closed based on National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Comm. of the President's
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 557 F. Supp. 524 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 711 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir. 1983), in which the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
found that subgroups formed by an advisory committee to provide information and recom-
mendations were not themselves advisory committees. Id. at 529. Rather, the court rea-
soned, they were groups to advise the advisory committee and therefore removed from the
literal language of the FACA. Id. Also, in FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466
U.S. 463 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled that meetings between a panel of the FCC and
foreign officials were not subject to the Sunshine Act and therefore not open to the public.
Id. at 472-73. The Court viewed those meetings as informational in nature and stated that
to require all meetings of this sort to be open to the public would "impair normal agency
operations without achieving significant public benefit." Id. at 470 (footnote omitted).
248. 5 U.S.C. § 566(a) (Supp. V 1993).
249. Id. § 566(b).
250. Id.
251. The Senate committee report stated that the agency head may "accept all, part or
none of the consensus proposal." S. REP. No. 97, at 19 (1989). Harter, supra note 84, at 65
(stating that an agency representative's participation does not bind the agency).
252. 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(7) (Supp. V 1993). This section specifically states that "the
agency, to the maximum extent possible consistent with the legal obligations of the agency,
will use the consensus of the committee with respect to the proposed rule as the basis for
the rule proposed by the agency for notice and comment." Id.; see also S. REP. No. 97, at
19 (stating that an agency is expected to "make a good faith effort to use the consensus rule
as the basis for the published rule").
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To expedite this process, the Act provides that a "facilitator" may be
appointed.253 Defined as "a person who impartially aids in the discus-
sions and negotiations among the members of a negotiated rulemaking
committee, 254 the facilitator, as a neutral party, heads the meetings, as-
sists the committee members in discussing and negotiating the issues, and
keeps the minutes and records in accordance with FACA.255
In addition to a convener and a facilitator, 6 the Act allows an agency
engaging in negotiated rulemaking to utilize federal and private property
and services, with or without reimbursement, so long as the owner's con-
sent is obtained.2 57 Thus, an agency may take advantage of a variety of
resources to achieve its goals. For example, the Act permits an agency to
utilize both office space and computer time donated by private parties as
well as services of a facilitator from another agency.2 58 Additionally, an
agency may employ technical experts from other agencies or private firms
in the process. 259 Reimbursement for these donated services or facilities
is decided on a case-by-case basis.26° One final resource available to as-
sist the negotiated rulemaking committee is the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, which can furnish conveners, facilitators, or training
in the negotiated rulemaking process.26'
With respect to committee procedures and operations, section 566 spe-
cifically states that the requirements of section 553 of the APA shall not
253. 5 U.S.C. § 566(c) (Supp. V 1993). Section 566(c) sets out the method by which a
facilitator is designated:
an agency may nominate either a person from the Federal Government or a per-
son from outside the Federal Government to serve as a facilitator for the negotia-
tions of the committee, subject to the approval of the committee by consensus. If
the committee does not approve the nominee of the agency for facilitator, the
agency shall submit a substitute nomination. If a committee does not approve
any nominee of the agency for facilitator, the committee shall select by consensus
a person to serve as facilitator. A person designated to represent the agency in
substantive issues may not serve as facilitator or otherwise chair the committee.
Id.
254. 5 U.S.C. § 562(4) (Supp. V 1993).
255. Id. § 566(d)(1) to -(3). Under the Freedom of Information Act, the requirement
of keeping minutes and records does not encompass the release of the personal notes and
materials of the committee members or the facilitator. Id. § 566(d)(3); see Mead Data
Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 575 F.2d 932, 934-35 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(holding that predecisional conclusions are protected from public exposure).
256. See supra notes 229-33, 253-55 and accompanying text (discussing the roles of the
convenor and the facilitator, respectively).
257. 5 U.S.C. § 568(b) (Supp. V 1995).
258. S. REP. No. 97, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1989).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 5 U.S.C. § 568(b). Section 553 of the APA provides an informal rulemaking proce-
dure. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
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apply.262 Rather, a negotiated rulemaking committee may adopt proce-
dures for its own operation.263 Section 566 also states that upon complet-
ing negotiations, if the committee reaches an agreement on a proposed
rule, the committee must transmit that proposal to the agency. 2" If no
consensus on a proposed rule is achieved, the committee may submit a
report to the agency identifying any issues upon which the committee
reached a consensus together with "any other information, recommenda-
tions, or materials that the committee considers appropriate. ' 265 Fur-
thermore, any individual committee member may include as an
addendum to the report any other information or comments that he or
she would like the agency to consider.266 Pursuant to the FACA require-
ments, the committee also must submit records required under FACA
sections 10(b) and (c) to the agency, including documents considered by
the committee during its deliberations and the minutes of each advisory
committee meeting.267
D. Funding the Committee
As previously established, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act specifically
requires that negotiated rulemaking committees must comply with FACA
"except as otherwise provided.,, 268 How and when agencies may reim-
burse committee members for expenses is one such exception.269 Mem-
262. 5 U.S.C. § 566(e) (Supp. V 1993).
263. 5 U.S.C. § 566(e). This provision provides the committee "the flexibility to ad-
dress only those procedural issues that need to be resolved," and to do so expeditiously
and unhampered by the formalized procedure of the APA. S. REP. No. 97, at 20.
264. 5 U.S.C. § 566(f).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. § 566(g). Sections 10(b) and 10(c) of the FACA provide the following:
(b) Subject to section 552 of title 5, United States Code, the records, reports,
transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other
documents which were made available to or prepared for or by each advisory
committee shall be available for public inspection and copying at a single location
in the offices of the advisory committee or the agency to which the advisory com-
mittee reports until the advisory committee ceases to exist.
(c) Detailed minutes of each meeting of each advisory committee shall be kept
and shall contain a record of the persons present, a complete and accurate de-
scription of matters discussed and conclusions reached, and copies of all reports
received, issued, or approved by the advisory committee. The accuracy of all min-
utes shall be certified to by the chairman of the advisory committee.
5 U.S.C. app. § 10(b),(c) (1988).
268. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
269. 5 U.S.C. § 568(c) (Supp. V 1993); see 5 U.S.C. app. § 7(d) (1988). Section 7(d) of
FACA authorizes agencies to compensate committee members, staff members, and consul-
tants for certain expenses. Id. FACA requires the General Services Administration to
issue uniform regulations regarding the compensation that may be paid and delineates sev-
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bers of negotiated rulemaking committees are responsible generally for
their own expenses.270 If a committee member can show that he or she
lacks the financial resources to participate in the committee and the
agency finds that this same member's participation is essential for repre-
sentation of his or her interests, the agency may reimburse that member's
expenses.27 1 Significantly, the use of the word "may" in the Act indicates
that the agency is authorized, but not necessarily required, to pay such
expenses in these exceptional cases. 272 Nevertheless, once a committee
member is found eligible, the agency must pay that member's expenses
pursuant to section 7(d) of FACA, which includes "reasonable travel and
per diem expenses, expenses to obtain technical assistance, and a reason-
able rate of compensation.,
273
One particular concern that may arise when an agency reimburses a
committee member who represents private interests is whether that com-
mittee member is then considered a federal employee. 274 If so, that com-
mittee member, as a federal employee, would be subject to the criminal
conflict provisions in Title 18 of the United States Code, which would bar
the member from participating in any future activities related to the ne-
gotiated rule.275 Section 568(d) of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, how-
ever, clearly states that under section 568(c), reimbursement to
committee members does not conclusively classify that person as a fed-
eral guidelines relevant to the forthcoming regulations. Id. app. § 7(d)(1). These guide-
lines authorize reimbursement to all committee members for travel and per diem expenses
and to handicapped members for expenses related to their handicap. Id. app.
§ 7(d)(1)(B),(C). A ceiling exists, however, on the amount of compensation that may be
paid to any one person. id. app. § 7(d)(1)(A).
270. 5 U.S.C. § 568(c).
271. Id. § 568(c)(1) to -(2).
272. Id. As noted in the Senate committee report, there are several reasons for this
provision. First, the negotiated rulemaking process "usually cost[s] more, initially, than
conventional rulemaking procedures in which a few agency employees draft the proposed
rule." S. REP. No. 97, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989). The bulk of these costs involve
"setting up meetings, providing clerical and technical assistance, and making agency offi-
cials available for extended periods of time." Id. Consequently, if the agency, in addition
to the foregoing expenses, also had to fund travel and per diem costs, the entire negotiating
process could be jeopardized. Id. On the other hand, the Act recognizes that a negotiated
rulemaking committee may include groups of people who are unable to fund their ex-
penses, but who are critical to the successful function of the negotiation. Id. Thus, section
568(c) allows agency flexibility in "hold[ing] down costs while nevertheless ensuring that
agencies are able to conduct negotiated rulemaking which require the participation of fi-
nancially needy representatives." Id.
273. 5 U.S.C. § 568(c).
274. S. REP. No. 97, at 25.
275. Id.
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eral employee.276 Thus, it appears that section 568(d) has both antici-
pated and resolved this concern.
E. Termination of the Committee
Section 567 provides for the termination of a negotiated rulemaking
committee and states that, generally, a committee is dissolved once a final
rule has been promulgated.277 Deviations from this provision are permis-
sible when the committee's charter contains an earlier ending date,278
when the agency, along with the committee, decides to terminate, 279 or
when the committee independently calls for its own dissolution.280
F. The Role of the Administrative Conference of the United States
The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) en-
couraged the use of negotiated rulemaking 281 because of frustration over
the existing notice and comment procedure and hybrid rulemaking.282
276. 5 U.S.C. § 568(d).
277. 5 U.S.C. § 567 (Supp. V 1994). This section differs from FACA's requirements for
termination of a committee. Under FACA, an advisory committee's charter specifies a
termination date, which can only be altered if the agency, prior to that date, determines
that the committee should continue to function and renews its charter prior to the sched-
uled termination date. S. REP. No. 97, at 21. The original termination date, however, can
never be more than two years after the date of the committee's charter. Id. In contrast,
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act recognizes the need for greater flexibility in using negoti-
ated rulemaking because promulgation of a final rule potentially could take more than two
years. Id. An example of this problem is an agency that recalls a dormant committee to
give its analysis of a proposed final rule developed from committee efforts before publica-
tion. Id. Thus, reconvening the committee could take place without a renewed charter as
would be required by FACA, even if it takes place more than two years after the commit-
tee's inception. Id.
278. 5 U.S.C. § 567. In this case, the charter could dissolve the committee on a speci-
fied date even before a final rule is actually promulgated. S. REP. No. 97, at 21. Addition-
ally, a charter could specify that the committee must terminate when a proposed rule
merely is issued by the agency, regardless of a final rule. Id.
279. 5 U.S.C. § 567. This provision provides the agency the authority to initiate termi-
nation of the committee. S. REP. No. 97, at 21. Of course, this authority is not unilateral.
The agency must consult with the committee before it takes any action to disband the
committee. Id. This provision could be used in the event of an agency's fiscal constraints
or where the committee simply fails to act after a lengthy impasse yet refuses to disband.
Id. Because the statute only requires that the agency consult with the committee before
termination, the agency retains final authority over the committee's existence as long as
the agency does not abuse its discretion and does not act in bad faith. Id. 21-22.
280. 5 U.S.C. § 567. This provision allows the committee to dissolve itself when the
committee's work is finished and it chooses not to wait for a final rule or when committee
negotiations have simply failed. S. REP. No. 97, at 22.
281. Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation 82-4), 47
Fed. Reg. 30,708, 30,709 (1982) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1992)).
282. Id. at 30,708; see also supra notes 15-30 and accompanying text (discussing short-
comings of traditional rulemaking).
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After noting some examples of successful negotiations, ACUS made fur-
ther recommendations in 1985 to address the dynamics of the negotiation
process in the rulemaking setting.283 Predictably, ACUS would have a
significant role in the continued use of negotiated rulemaking and Con-
gress codified that role in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act.28
Section 569 details ACUS' role in the negotiation process, and specifi-
cally lists ACUS as a source of information for agencies that seek to form
a negotiated rulemaking committee for a proposed rule.285 Agencies also
are permitted to contact other persons or institutions, both private and
public, for additional guidance.286 One recommended source is other
government agencies that have experience in negotiated rulemaking.
287
To help agencies obtain conveners and facilitators, ACUS, working
with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, maintains a roster
of people who have experience in or an interest in serving in those capaci-
ties,2ss including people from both the private and public sector.289 The
agencies, however, are not precluded from utilizing individuals and orga-
nizations from both private and public sources that are not from the
above-mentioned rosters.290 Furthermore, because many agencies have
not used negotiated rulemaking, ACUS is charged with creating proce-
dures whereby agencies can obtain quick access to conveners and
facilitators.29' In short, ACUS' goal in creating these procedural guide-
lines is to minimize the "confusion and red tape" that could potentially be
involved in the process of obtaining convener or facilitator services.22
Under section 569(e), ACUS also acts as a mentor by providing pro-
grams on the elements and implementation of negotiated rulemaking,
which are open to agency personnel and other individuals.293 The provi-
283. Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation 85-5), 50
Fed. Reg. 52,895 (1985) (codified at I C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1992)) (codifying the new
rulemaking alternative).
284. 5 U.S.C. § 569 (Supp. V 1994). The caption for this section is "Role of Administra-
tive Conference of the United States and other entities." Id.
285. Id. § 569(a).
286. Id.; see S. REP. No. 97, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1989) (providing specific ex-
amples of other organizations that may provide useful information).
287. 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1992).
288. 5 U.S.C. § 569(b).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. § 569(c)(1); see S. REP. No. 97, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1989) (explaining that
a major obstacle for agencies seeking to employ the assistance of conveners or facilitators
is the "difficulty the agency may encounter in designing and issuing a contract or other
employment document").
292. S. REP. No. 97, at 26.
293. 5 U.S.C. § 569(e). The Senate committee report identifies possible topics, such as
deciding when to use negotiated rulemaking, guiding agency interaction with a convener,
1994]
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sion also authorizes ACUS to offer this training to private individuals on
a reimbursable basis and federal personnel on either a reimbursable or
nonreimbursable basis.294
Because funding of a negotiated rulemaking project is an agency con-
cern, agencies can request that ACUS provide funding to pay for all or
part of the start-up costs for forming a negotiated rulemaking committee
and the expenses incurred from conducting a negotiated exercise.295
ACUS is not necessarily mandated to finance the expenses incurred by an
agency as a result of negotiated rulemaking.296 The Chairman of ACUS
has the discretion to select the type and amount of payments that ACUS
will make.297 In granting or denying funds to an agency, ACUS must
consider its charge: to advance negotiated rulemaking in federal agen-
cies.2 98 One last funding issue, which was inserted at ACUS' request,
299
permits ACUS to further the Act's goal by accepting and applying dona-
tions and in-kind contributions for negotiated rulemaking.30 ° In other
words, donations to ACUS may be applied not only toward expenses for
conveners, facilitators, training, and the like, which are specifically listed
in the statute, but also to any other expenses that may promote negoti-
ated rulemaking.3 1
Furthermore, to give agencies a central source for negotiated rulemak-
ing information and to provide Congress with a status report on the effec-
defining what regulatory issues need to be addressed, dealing with fiscal concerns related
to negotiations, and determining the scope of the committee's work. S. REP. No. 97, at 27.
In addition, while not articulated in the Act, the Senate committee report stated that
ACUS may offer training through a variety of institutions besides itself including the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service, the Government Services Administration, and
other government agencies or private organizations. Id.
294. 5 U.S.C. § 569(e). The Senate committee report specified that private individuals
include both federal and nonfederal personnel. S. REP. No. 97, at 27. Federal Personnel
may receive training on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, but nonfederal person-
nel may only be offered training on a reimbursable basis. Id. The report did not attempt
to explain the different treatment and it did not explain under what circumstances a federal
employee would reimburse ACUS for the negotiation training. See id.
295. 5 U.S.C. § 569(f). Some agencies may choose not to use negotiated rulemaking
because of the initial start-up costs that are not associated with traditional rulemaking. S.
REP. No. 97, at 27. Consequently, ACUS' ability to reduce agency expenditures is in-
tended to encourage more agencies to utilize negotiated rulemaking. Id. Examples of
start-up costs include, but are not limited to, expenses for conveners and facilitators, eligi-
ble committee members, and training. See 5 U.S.C. § 569(f)(1) to -(3).
296. See 5 U.S.C. § 569(f).
297. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 97, at 28 (stating that any discussion to provide funding
must be noted and explained in ACUS' biennial report submitted to Congress).
298. 5 U.S.C. § 569(f); see S. REP. No. 97, at 28.
299. S. REP. No. 97, at 28.
300. 5 U.S.C. § 569(g).
301. S. REP. No. 97, at 28.
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tiveness of the statute,3" 2 ACUS must compile and maintain data related
to negotiated rulemaking.30 3 To assist in this endeavor, agencies making
use of negotiated rulemaking must provide ACUS with negotiated
rulemaking committee reports and all other relevant information reflec-
tive of the agency's negotiation experience. 3 4 ACUS must review and
analyze the reports and materials, and then generate a biennial compila-
tion which is forwarded to the Senate Committee on Governmental Af-
fairs and the appropriate House committees. 3 5 The biennial report
includes suggestions for effective agency use of negotiated rulemaking
and an accounting of all ACUS expenditures made to further the goals of
the Act.3 °6
G. Judicial Review and Duration of the Act
Some of the primary benefits of negotiated rulemaking include the is-
suance of more workable rules, as well as reductions in litigation, time,
and costs normally associated with the traditional rulemaking proce-
dure.30 7 While actions taken by agencies to create, join in, or terminate a
negotiated rulemaking committee are not reviewable,30 8 the Act provides
for judicial review of a negotiated rule.30 9 In fact, section 570 preserves
the right to challenge an agency's rule when it is the product of a negoti-
ated rulemaking proceeding.310 More specifically, the APA allows chal-
lenges to this provision, such that a court could overturn a negotiated rule
if it found that in promulgating the rule, the agency's actions were "arbi-
302. Id. at 26.
303. 5 U.S.C. § 569(d)(1). This information is available to aid agencies as well as par-
ties involved in the negotiations. Id.
304. Id. § 569(d)(2).
305. Id. § 569(d)(3).
306. Id. § 569(d)(3)(A),(B). The purpose of this report is to review agency use of the
negotiation process during the previous two years and to make suggestions for any neces-
sary improvements that could be implemented through legislation. S. REP. No. 97, at 27.
307. See Recommendation 82-4, supra note 128; S. REP. No. 97, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(stating that negotiated rulemaking "produced more effective rules in less time, with less
overall cost and less litigation" according to various agency witnesses).
308. 5 U.S.C. § 570 (Supp. V 1994). Without this provision, agency actions relating to
negotiated rulemaking prior to the final rule's publication could be subject to interruption
and delay due to judicial intervention. S. REP. No. 97, at 28. This provision reflects section
704 of the APA, which says that agency action is judicially reviewable by statute or when
final agency action allows for no other in-court remedy. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988). In contrast,
agency action that is not final, but is only intermediate, preliminary, or procedural, is not
reviewable until there is a final agency action. Id.
309. 5 U.S.C. § 570.
310. Id.; see S. REP. No. 97, at 28. Section 570 states that "[n]othing in this section shall
bar judicial review of a rule if such judicial review is otherwise provided by law." 5 U.S.C.
§ 570.
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trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.",
311
To avoid the scrutiny of judicial review, a rulemaking body must ade-
quately inform interested parties of any pending negotiations. 312 By do-
ing so, the negotiated rulemaking committee ensures that all interests are
represented throughout the rulemaking process.313 If the committee does
reach a consensus, it also should examine the rule closely to determine
whether it meets statutory requirements for promulgation.3 14 Similarly,
the committee should examine carefully the agency's authority to formu-
late the particular rule since the APA clearly allows judicial review to
determine whether an agency has overstepped its bounds.315 Finally,
under section 570 of the Act, rules that are the product of negotiated
rulemaking receive no greater deference from a court than a rule result-
ing from other rulemaking methods.31 6
In terms of the duration of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, concerns
about the effectiveness of the negotiated rulemaking process prompted
inclusion of a provision for the Act's expiration after six years.317 The
convening agency may make exceptions to this six year period for those
negotiations begun prior to the expiration date and whose continuation is
deemed to be in the best interest of the parties involved.31 8
After the codification of the negotiated rulemaking process, various
agencies began exploring its use.3 19 Yet, even today, the IRS persists in
311. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
312. See Perritt, supra note 84, at 1709.
313. Id.
314. See Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the
Courts?, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 17-25 (1985) (noting that the goal of a regulation is to
serve the statute under which it is promulgated).
315. See Perritt, supra note 84, at 1702-03 (suggesting that an agency promulgating a
negotiated rule should be given wide latitude for discretion because the nature of the "pro-
cess ensures that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at relevant factors and considered
alternatives" (footnote omitted)). Others note that negotiators often engage in com-
promises and political log rolling, thereby producing rules that are unwieldy and defective
in fulfilling the goals of the statute for which they were promulgated to serve. See, Wald,
supra note 314, at 17-18.
316. 5 U.S.C. § 570 (Supp. V 1993).
317. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 11, 104 Stat. 2736,
2747-48 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (Supp. V 1993)). .
318. 5 U.S.C. § 571 (Supp. V 1993) (stating that exceptions will be allowed to continue
until the negotiations naturally terminate).
319. See, e.g., Daily Labor Rep. (BNA) at A-I1 (May 23, 1991) (reporting that the
Department of Labor says it has begun exploring alternative rulemaking processes includ-
ing negotiated rulemaking to avoid going to court to resolve its disputes); ARAC to Review
EPA's Draft Rules This Month on Allowance Auctions, Util. Env't Rep., Apr. 5, 1991, at 9,
available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, UER File (documenting EPA negotiations on acid
rain regulations); Industry Panel to Guide Revisions of Ex Parte Rules, Gas Daily, Apr. 11,
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choosing not to utilize negotiated rulemaking to solve the problems of
delayed and repeatedly litigated regulations. The following section ex-
plores the ill-fated Subchapter S one class of stock requirement, which
may have benefitted from the application of the negotiated rulemaking
process.
VI. BACKGROUND OF THE ONE CLASS OF STOCK REQUIREMENT
The first set of regulations that dealt with the one class of stock provi-
sion, issued under former section 1371(a)(4) in 1958,320 prompted exten-
sive litigation.321 Ultimately, the litigation led to a revision of the
regulations in 1966. The revision, as applied, continued to provoke litiga-
tion until 1973, when the IRS announced that it would revise its regula-
tions again and cease to litigate questions related to forming a second
class of stock.322
Little progress occurred in this area until 1982, when Congress passed
the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982.323 The Revision Act renumbered
former section 1371(a)(4) as section 1361(b)(1)(D), 324 and, not unmindful
of the myriad of problems regarding the one class of stock requirement as
it relates to debt, added section 1361(c)(5).325 Section 1361(c)(5) pro-
1991 (Pasha Publications, Inc.) available in LEXIS, News Library, Zenl file (reporting on
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's study on negotiated rulemaking); Draft Doc-
ument Due on Battery Recycling, 62 Metals Wk (McGraw-Hill) No. 11, at 6,6 (Mar. 18,
1991) (reporting that the EPA started using the negotiated rulemaking process on battery
recycling rules); NRC Adopts Rule to Speed Repository Licensing, 34 Nuclear News
(American Nuclear Society) No. 160, at 63, 63-64 (Apr., 1991) (reporting on EPA negotia-
tions concerning rules for a geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste); The CPI
Agree to Cut Fugitive Emissions, 98 Chemical Engineering (McGraw-Hill) No. 1, at 25, 25
(Jan. 1991) (reporting on the EPA's use of negotiated rulemaking for emissions standards);
USCG Works to Establish Standards for Oil Spill Response Equipment, 14 Oil Spill Intelli-
gence Rep. (Cutter Info. Corp.) No. 45, at 3, 3 (Nov. 21, 1991) (noting that the United
States Coast Guard set up a negotiated rulemaking team to develop regulations for the
United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990).
320. See EUSTICE & KUNTZ, supra note 3, 9 3.07[3][a], at 3-47 (explaining that under
former Treasury Regulation § 1.1371-1(g), debt instruments could be treated as stock, thus
creating a second class of stock).
321. See EUSTiCE & KUNTZ, supra note 3, 3.07[3][a], at 3-47 to 3-48 (stating that the
Tax Court found that the IRS misinterpreted the former regulation).
322. See EUSTICE & KUNTZ, supra note 3, 9 3.07[3][a], at 3-50 (stating the IRS an-
nounced that it would not litigate the question of whether a second class of stock existed);
Richard M. Lipton, The Proposed One Class of Stock Regulations: A First-Class Problem,
49 TAX NOTES 695, 696 (1990) (stating the IRS "lost every case" that involved the question
of whether debt constituted a second class of stock because the courts ruled that even if
such debt was equity for tax purposes, it did not constitute a second class of stock).
323. Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
324. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (1993).
325. Id. § 1361(c)(5).
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vides that straight debt will not be treated as a second class of stock under
prescribed circumstances. 326 Congress also authorized the IRS under sec-
tion 1361(c)(5) to draft regulations deemed "necessary or appropriate" to
effectuate "the proper treatment of straight debt. '3 27  On October 7,
1986, the IRS published proposed regulations defining S corporations;
328
however, it reserved the paragraph dealing with the one class of stock
requirement at that time.329 Four years later, the IRS issued proposed
regulations defining one class of stock for purposes of maintaining Sub-
chapter S corporation status.330 At that time, no one could have pre-
dicted the problems that would ensue.33'
The major concerns with the 1990 proposed regulations cited by busi-
ness and academia centered on four key points. First, the proposed regu-
lations state that a second class of stock would come into being if all
outstanding shares did not confer identical distribution and liquidation
rights.332 In other words, if the distributions varied in timing or amount,
they would be considered nonconforming distributions regardless of how
the timing or amounts were determined.333 Curiously, the regulations
disregard differences in voting rights, restrictions on stock transferability,
and rights under shareholder buy-sell agreements in determining stock
status.334
A second area of concern referred to the provision that any debt in-
strument, regardless of its classification as debt, (1) that is not subject to
the straight debt safe harbor, or (2) that constitutes equity or allows the
holder of the debt instrument to be classified as a stockholder under the
federal tax law, would be deemed a second class of stock.3 35 To qualify
326. Id. The debt instrument must satisfy three tests: "(i) the interest rate (and interest
payment dates) are not contingent on profits, the borrower's discretion, or similar factors,
(ii) there is no convertibility (directly or indirectly) into stock, and (iii) the creditor is an
individual (other than a nonresident alien), an estate, or a trust described in paragraph
(2)." Id. § 1361(c)(5)(B)(i) to -(iii).
327. Id. § 1361(c)(5)(C).
328. Proposed Rulemaking, 51 Fed. Reg. 35,659 (1986).
329. Id.
330. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,870 (1990). The IRS received
comments to the notice and held a public hearing, but apparently due to extensive discon-
tent with the proposed regulations. the IRS issued new proposed regulations on August 13,
1991 replacing those issued in 1990. 56 Fed. Reg. 38,391 (1991).
331. See generally Lipton, supra note 322 (discussing the problems surrounding the
1990 proposed regulations).
332. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(2)(i), 55 Fed. Reg. at 40,872.
333. Id. A second class of stock would come into existence if the difference in rights
was established pursuant to the articles of incorporation, corporate bylaws, corporate char-
ter, "by operation of state law, by administrative action, or by agreement." Id.
334. See id.
335. See id. § 1.1361-1(1)(3)(ii), 55 Fed Reg. at 40,873.
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for the debt safe harbor, the obligation must be "straight debt ' 336 that
bears a reasonable interest rate.337 By adopting the requirement of a rea-
sonable interest rate to qualify a debt obligation under the safe harbor
limits, the proposed regulations appear to have added a fourth require-
ment which consequently could put the status of many S corporations at
risk depending on whether their debt, when incurred, bore "reasonable"
interest rates.
338
Equally troubling was the debt-equity controversy resulting from the
IRS' interpretation of the legislative history of the Revision Act.33 9 Its
interpretation assumed that Congress intended to supplant the pre-1982
case law with the straight debt safe harbor of section 1361(c)(5) of the
Code.34 ° As a result, any purported debt instrument that falls outside of
the safe harbor rules will be treated as a second class of stock if it consti-
tutes equity under general principles of federal tax law.341 On the other
hand, opponents argue that if Congress had intended the provision to be
interpreted in this manner, it would have clearly and explicitly indicated
that fact.
342
336. Id. § 1.1361-1(1)(4)(i), 55 Fed Reg. at 40, 873. Straight debt is defined as a written
unconditional promise to pay on demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money if
(1) the interest rate and interest payment dates are not contingent on profits, the corpora-
tions discretion, or similar factors, (2) it bears an interest rate that is reasonable, (3) it is
not convertible (directly or indirectly) into stock, and (4) the creditor is "an individual
(other than a nonresident alien), an estate, or a trust described in section 1361(c)(2)." Id.
§ 1.1361-1(1)(4)(i)(A) to (D).
337. Id. § 1.1361-1(l)(4)(ii)(A), 55 Fed. Reg. at 40,874. Whether the interest rate is
reasonable depends upon "all of the facts and circumstances, including the amount bor-
rowed and the timing and amount of payments due under the obligation." Id. Two safe
harbors, however, exist for satisfying the reasonable interest rate requirement. Id.
§ 1.1361-1(1)(4)(ii)(C). "[An obligation is treated as bearing a reasonable interest rate if
the obligation has a yield to maturity that is at least equal to the applicable Federal rate,
but not more than five percentage points above the applicable Federal rate ... " Id.
§ 1.1361-1(1)(4)(ii)(C), 55 Fed. Reg. at 40,874. Other determinative factors are involved
when dealing with obligations bearing a variable rate. Id. § 1.1361-1(I)(4)(ii)(B), 55 Fed.
Reg. at 40,874.
338. Id. § 1.1361-1(l)(4)(ii)(A); see Lipton, supra note 322, at 700 (explaining that this
risk results from situations where the corporation has borrowed money from shareholders
at rates below the federal rate or where repayment of the debt does not follow a schedule).
339. See Lipton, supra note 322, at 699.
340. Id. (explaining that prior case law struck down the per se treatment of debt as a
second class of stock if the IRS classified the debt as equity for tax purposes); see, e.g.,
Portage Plastics Co. v. United States, 486 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1973); Armory Cotton Oil Co.
v. United States, 468 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1972); Shores Realty Co. V. United States, 468
F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1972).
341. See Lipton, supra note 322, at 699.
342. Id. One opponent, Richard M. Lipton, stated that "[t]he only 'hint' in the legisla-
tive history which could be viewed as support of the IRS' position is the statement that
'[tihe classification of an instrument outside the safe harbor rules as stock or debt will be
1994]
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A third area of concern centers on call options, warrants, and similar
instruments (collectively, call option). 343  A corporation would be
deemed to have a second class of stock if it is substantially certain that
the call options will be exercised by the holders.344 Furthermore, this
provision would apply regardless of whether the owner of the call option
is treated as the owner of the underlying stock under the general princi-
ples of federal tax law.345
The opponents of this provision claim that the call options provision
would defy one of the purposes for which the one class of stock exists,
which is to avoid the complex administrative procedures that are neces-
sary in calculating losses and gains when more than one class of stock is
issued by a corporation.346 Because such a calculation of losses and gains
is not necessary with respect to call options, they argue, the inclusion of
call options in the regulation violates the purpose of the one class of stock
provision.347 Moreover, opponents contend that, assuming the call op-
tion relates to the underlying stock, that option would create no rights
other than the right to purchase stock of which there is only one class.
348
Finally, the proposed regulations were to become effective for tax years
beginning after 1982, with some provisions taking effect ninety days after
the final regulations were published.349 As a result, shareholders of an S
corporation who had relied upon previous case law and the sound advice
of their tax practitioner could have had their S corporation status retroac-
tively revoked.350 The proposed retroactive application of the regulations
caused the greatest clamor among both practitioners and academics who
made under usual tax law classification principles.' " Id. (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 640, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982)).
343. Id. at 701.
344. Prop. Treas. Reg § 1.1361-1(I)(3)(iii), 55 Fed. Reg. 40,870, 40,873 (1990).
345. Id. The provision defines certainty of exercise and provides three safe harbors as
they relate to the treatment of a call option as a second class of stock. Id. § 1.1361-
l(l)(3)(iii)(A) to (C). Opponents of this provision criticize the IRS' definition of certainty
as well as the three safe harbors. See Lipton, supra note 322, at 701.
346. See Lipton. supra note 322, at 701.
347. See id. (explaining that "[n]o allocation of income or loss would be made with
respect to a call option," so there is no need "to extend the one class of stock requirement
to call options").
348. Id.
349. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(1)(7), 55 Fed. Reg. at 40,875.
350. See Lipton, supra note 322, at 702 (stating that because of the broad and retroac-
tive effect of the proposed rules, "many S corporations may have their S status terminated
very abruptly"); Sens. Bumpers, Kasten Urge Revision of One-Class-of-Stock S Corp Rules,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at G-6, G-6 (Feb. 4, 1991) [hereinafter Sens. Bumper, Kas-
ten] (stating that "the retroactive application of the non-conforming distribution defini-
tions may threaten the status of S corporations").
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informed Congress of their views, claiming that these regulations would
virtually eliminate most S corporations.35'
On December 20, 1990, the IRS set a public hearing for the one class of
stock rule for February 15, 1991.352 Shortly thereafter, the IRS received
letters requesting hearing time and criticizing the regulations. For exam-
ple, Marshall & Poe of Elkhart, Indiana, said that "[c]haos would defi-
nitely be the result of the proposed regulations regarding 'S'
corporations. The people who would be most hurt are those with small
businesses. These regulations would throw their whole existence into
chaos because of the Hitler-like restrictions being proposed. No 'S' cor-
poration would survive. 353 Another private firm, Drees, Perugini & Co.,
of Indianapolis, Indiana urged the IRS to withdraw the regulations be-
cause they were an unreasonable way to raise tax revenues.354 Other crit-
ics included Senate Small Business Committee Chairman Bumpers and
ranking minority member Kasten who urged Treasury Secretary Brady to
revise the regulations.355 Various associations also commented on the
proposed regulations. For example, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) said that the proposed regulations were in-
consistent with congressional intent and would create enormous practical
problems if implemented in the present form.356 Further, the AICPA
urged the IRS to withdraw the proposed regulations and convene a series
of discussions for the development of new regulations.357 The National
Association of Manufacturers similarly urged the withdrawal of the pro-
posed regulations, claiming they would disrupt the status of many S cor-
porations.35" Additionally, the National Association of Wholesalers-
Distributors said that the proposed regulations go beyond the limits of
the law, that the distribution rules were burdensome, and that the refer-
351. ABA House of Delegates Defers Action on Retroactive Tax Legislation Resolution,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at G-3, G-3 (Feb. 13, 1991) (noting the ABA's approval "of
a resolution that would urge Congress to minimize the" negative effects of retroactive
application).
352. 50 TAX NOTES 249 (1991).
353. IRS Releases 15 Comment Letters on a Variety of Proposed Regulations, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 239, at G-4, G-4 (Dec. 12, 1990).
354. IRS Releases 29 Comment Letters on a Variety of Proposed Regulations, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 244, at G-3, G-3 to G-4 (Dec. 19, 1990).
355. See Sens. Bumper, Kasten, supra note 350, at G-6.
356. IRS Releases 66 Comment Letters on a Variety of Proposed Regulations, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at G-3, G-3 to G-4 (Feb. 7, 1991) [hereinafter 66 Comment Letters].
357. Id.
358. IRS Releases 18 Comment Letters on a Variety of Proposed Regulations, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at G-2, G-2 to G-3 (Feb. 22, 1991).
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ence to inadvertent terminations was ambiguous. 359 Another argument
made by the American Bar Association Section of Taxation suggested
that disqualification of an S election should not be used as a solution to a
problem where other appropriate solutions are available.36°
As a result, Treasury withdrew the proposed regulations and, at the end
of July 1991, it submitted new Subchapter S one class of stock proposed
regulations. 361 While it generally is agreed that the 1991 version of the
proposed regulations is far better than the 1990 version, problems con-
cerning the second attempt at formulating regulations for the one class of
stock requirement exist.36 2
VII. THEORY INTO PRACTICE: NEGOTIATING THE
SUBCHAPTER S REGULATIONS
Considering the foregoing, there can be little doubt that the regulations
preceding and including the 1990 proposed regulations were basically a
disaster. Consequently, even conceding that negotiation is not always the
best method to formulate regulations,36 3 it still may be useful to examine
whether the constructs of negotiated rulemaking would favor its applica-
tion in the context of the failed Subchapter S one class of stock
regulations.
First, as Fisher and Ury have pointed out, parties will only bargain if
the negotiations are likely to produce a better result than another form of
359. IRS Releases 21 Comment Letters on a Variety of Proposed Regulations, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at G-5, G-5 (Feb. 19, 1991).
360. 66 Comment Letters, supra note 356, at G-5 (stating that "disqualification of an S
election should not result from non-conforming distributions unless they are part of a de-
liberate pattern to avoid the single class of stock requirement"). Further, the ABA recom-
mended that "the regulations should not add a reasonable interest rate requirement to the
straight debt safe harbor ... and the final regulations should not be effective retroactively
except in abusive situations." Id.
361. Martin D. Ginsburg & Jack S. Levin, The New Subchapter S One Class of Stock
Proposed Regulation: Much Better, But Still Not Awfully Good, 53 TAX NOTES, 81, 81
(1991).
362. Id. (admitting that the 1991 version was an improvement over the 1990 proposed
regulations but still fails to resolve all of the problems associated with the original propo-
sal); see also Jerald D. August et al., The 'Kinder and Gentler' Proposed Single-Class-of-
Stock Regulations, 53 TAX NOTES 713, 714 (1991) (praising the revised proposed regula-
tions as a great improvement but criticizing the new rates and the new test because they
created new areas of uncertainty).
363. See Harter, supra note 84, at 42. Harter makes the point that negotiation is not
always the answer to promulgating rules any more than "it is for settling all disputes." Id.
Furthermore, the mere fact that a process is assumed to be nonadversarial does not guar-
antee that people will attempt "to resolve disputes with openness and reasonableness." Id.
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decisional action. 3" A review of the stormy history of only a single as-
pect of the one class of stock issue, the debt instruments question,365
reveals the myriad of problems surrounding the regulation.366 Given the
failure of the IRS to deliver an acceptable set of regulations, it would be
logical to assume that parties with an interest in the one class of stock
issue would view their interests as being better served by a bargaining
process. Therefore, the requirement that the parties believe that they
have a better chance of successfully reaching a more favorable result
through negotiation would be met.
As to the equality of the participants,367 there was no single group that
held a significant bargaining advantage. The participants included busi-
ness concerns, lawyers, and accountants who regularly advise S corpora-
tions.368 While some groups may have had slightly different concerns
with certain aspects of the regulations, generally speaking, most questions
regarding them centered around a finite number of issues that most par-
ties found problematic.3 69 Among the issues causing the most difficulty
was the intractable problem of the retroactivity of the regulations. 37 ° As
previously noted, most parties believed that the application of the retro-
364. See FISHER & URY, supra note 92, at 20 (contending that one negotiates "to reach
an agreement that satisfies his substantive interests").
365. See Lipton, supra note 322, at 696. The one class of stock provision was a require-
ment for qualification for Subchapter S status under section § 1371(a)(4) of the 1954 Code.
Id. Furthermore, the regulations issued pursuant to this section "provided that debt instru-
ments could be treated as stock," which would invalidate an entity's S corporation status.
Id. This issue was litigated in the case of Gamman v. Commissioner. 46 T.C. 1 (1966),
which held that there was nothing in the legislative history, the law itself, or committee
discussions to indicate that all instruments that purport to be debt, but are in fact equity
capital, must be treated as a second class of stock. Id. at 8. A short time after Gamman,
the IRS amended the regulation "to eliminate the per se treatment of debt as a second
class of stock" and began to assert deficiencies based on the new regulation, but lost every
case. Lipton, supra note 322, at 696. Specifically, one author noted that in Portage Plastics
Co. v. United States, 486 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1973), and Shores Realty Co. v. United States,
468 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1972), "the courts concluded that former Reg. section 1.1371-1(g)
was invalid to the extent that such regulation treated debt as a second class of stock, even if
the debt was equity for tax purposes." Lipton, supra note 322, at 696. Lipton finally noted
that "[in 1973, the IRS threw in the towel" and refused to litigate the issue until further
regulations could provide clarification. Id.
366. See supra notes 331-50 and accompanying text (discussing serious flaws in the pro-
posed 1990 regulations).
367. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 350-59 and accompanying text.
369. See IRS Urged to Withdraw One-Class-of-Stock Rule; Terminations, Distributions
Cited, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at G-7, G-7 to G-8 (Feb. 19, 1991) (identifying con-
cerns such as the retroactive application of the proposed regulations, disqualification based
on nonconforming distributions, and treatment of call options as a second class of stock).
370. See supra notes 349-51 and accompanying text (detailing the problem of retroac-
tive application).
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active provision would lead to the disqualification of most S corpora-
tions.371 Other notable concerns included the debt-equity controversy,
call options, and distribution/liquidation rights controversies.372 In terms
of political or bargaining power, it does not appear that any of the poten-
tial participants in a negotiation would have more bargaining strength
over any other participant.373
Harter also notes that "[n]egotiations will clearly not work among an
auditorium full of people. '374 Relative to the Subchapter S regulations, a
review of the interested parties shows that a finite number of people who
could have effectively represented the concerns of all possible interested
parties because the issues of greatest concern were fairly few in
number. 375 For example, those making comments or requesting hearing
time on the failed 1990 regulations were primarily accounting firms,
3 7 6
law firms, and small businesses. In addition, the American Bar Associa-
tion and AICPA took a stand on withdrawal of the regulations.377 Trade
groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the Na-
tional Association of Wholesalers-Distributors, also commented on the
regulations.378 One Cincinnati, Ohio, firm suggested that the regulations
be withdrawn and a new set of regulations be developed by the American
Bar Association's Section on Taxation, AICPA's Tax Division, the IRS,
and Treasury. Thus, it seems clear there could have been a limited
number of individuals who could have represented the interests of all
concerned.
A successful negotiation also requires the negotiated matter to be ripe
for decision.37 9 In this instance, in view of the history of the regula-
tions,380 they were not only ripe for decision, but they were likely
overripe.
381
371. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 331-50 and accompanying text (discussing these issues in more
detail).
373. See Harter, supra note 84, at 46; supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Harter's requirement that there be a small number of people negotiating).
374. See Harter, supra note 84, at 46; supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Harter's requirement that there be a small number of people negotiating).
375. See supra notes 331-50 and accompanying text.
376. Four of the big six firms appear to have made requests to be heard with'respect to
the proposed Subchapter S regulations.
377. See supra notes 356-60, and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 358-59 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (explaining the term ripe).
380. See supra notes 319-30, 351-61 and accompanying text.
381. The history of the regulation indicates that the issues existing prior to the failed
proposed 1990 regulation and the numerous complaints concerning that regulation deter-
mined the issues for the regulation that the IRS ultimately published. As previously indi-
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Urgency for a resolution also contributes to a negotiation's likelihood
of success. If the parties do not see a need for the guidance and creation
of a regulation, then they will not perceive a reason to engage in a dia-
logue.382 In this instance, even though the 1991 proposed regulations
cured many of the deficiencies of the 1990 proposed regulations, the 1991
regulations still left a number of controversial issues unresolved. 38 3 Con-
sequently, it appears that there is still a sense of urgency for a solution to
the Subchapter S one class of stock requirement.
Finally, for a negotiated rulemaking experience to be successful, the
parties must believe that their efforts will be utilized.38 4 Implementation
of the negotiated regulation must be a clear possibility. Based on the
foregoing analysis, there is no apparent reason why the IRS, Treasury,
and a finite number of interested parties would not be able to negotiate a
regulation that could and likely would be implemented.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Based on the dismal results of the former regulation governing the one
class of stock rule, it appears that potential negotiators likely would feel
that they could negotiate a better result and place themselves in a better
position than leaving the promulgation to the IRS. This clearly would
have been the case when the proposed regulations were withdrawn in
October 1990 and new regulations were proposed in August 1991, be-
cause the IRS actually incorporated into the second regulation many of
the suggestions resulting from the multitudinous hours of hearings and
conferences. Furthermore, given the failed 1990 regulations, one can
only surmise that if the parties had a choice, they would have preferred to
have negotiated the 1990 regulations with the IRS and avoided the subse-
quent months spent on its criticism. The results surely would have been
better than the regulations that were eventually withdrawn.
Undoubtedly, problems that will prompt litigation still remain. 85
Whether the IRS will press the amorphous issue of taxpayer circumven-
cated, the final regulation also has been criticized. See supra note 362 and accompanying
text.
382. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
383. See supra note 362 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 125-27 and accom-
panying text (explaining that if negotiators did not believe their efforts would result in a
regulation, it would defeat the notion that parties negotiate to better their positions).
384. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
385. While the regulation appears to attempt to make it difficult to disqualify an S cor-
poration based on the existence of a second class of stock, one unsettling aspect of the
regulation is that "commercial contractual agreements" related to distribution and liquida-
tion proceeds are not binding if entered into to circumvent (emphasis added) the one class
of stock requirement. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(1)2(i), (iii)(A)(1) (1992). Yet, there is no sug-
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tion to avoid a second class of stock is speculative. This matter appears to
be the most problematic in the new regulations.
After withdrawing one set of regulations and promulgating final regu-
lations that still may be wrought with problems, the IRS should learn
from other agencies and employ the negotiated rulemaking process.
There would be little to lose in attempting to use the 1990 Rulemaking
Act, considering the time and effort that all parties put into producing the
potentially flawed 1991 final regulations. Quite clearly, the notice and
comment method failed in this context as it has failed in other instances.
It is submitted that by working together in a negotiation, there is a sub-
stantial likelihood of coming to a consensus that would protect all inter-
ests. The chances of litigation would be significantly reduced as would
the time, energy, and money expended on the process.
The IRS should join the ranks of other agencies that have successfully
used negotiated rulemaking. Considering that the Code is amended in
some respect on an annual basis and that some of those changes are sub-
stantial, regulations to define and to guide taxpayers have fallen far be-
hind the enactment of the new Code sections. Given the time frame
involved in these regulation projects and the ensuing backlog that has
been produced,386 experimenting with the negotiation process could
prove to be useful and successful.
gested standard to define circumvention. Thus, should the IRS claim that the employment,
loan, or lease agreement or other routine commercial contractual arrangement involved
the intent to circumvent the one class of stock requirement, the taxpayer must then carry
the burden of proof that there was no intent. In the event of an audit, this definitely gives
the revenue agent handling the audit some leverage in negotiation.
Other potential problems could arise in interpreting section 1.1361-1(b)(6) (a special
effective date provision) as it relates to I.R.C. § 83 restricted stock, id. § 1.1361-1(b)(6)
(1992), and interpreting the provisions that relate to buy-sell agreements, redemption
agreements, and transfer restrictions. Id. § 1.1361-1(1)(2)(iii). Likewise section 1.1316-
1(I)(4)(iii), which deals with call options is problematic, id. § 1.1316-1(l)(4)(iii), as is cer-
tain treatment of deferred compensation under section 1.1361-1(b)(4). Id. § 1.1316-
1(b)(4). All in all, "[tlhe July 1991 version of the one class of stock proposed regulation is
an enormous improvement over the October 1990 version. . . . But the July 1991 pro-
nouncement still is not awfully good." Ginsbury & Levin, supra note 361, at 95.
386. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Pro-
cess, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1390 (1992) (stating that the average time for an FTC proposed
regulation to become final is five years, four months).
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